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NOTES
APPLICABILITY OF CORPORATE CHARTER PROVISIONS
IN READJUSTMENTS UNDER THE HOLDING
COMPANY ACT
In applying the "fair and equitable" standard to reorganization plans as
required by Section 11(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,1 the
Securities and Exchange Commission has had to determine the effect of cor-
porate charter provisions describing the redemption and liquidation rights of
security holders. In The United Light and Power Company" the SEC held
that participation of preferred and common stockholders in a plan was not
to be measured exclusively by the liquidation provisions of the charter, but
by an equitable calculation of all rights surrendered, based on the investment
value of the securities held. Justification for this approach was the avoid-
ance of the supposed inequity of adding value to one class of securities at
the expense of another in the course of a liquidation enforced by a govern-
ment agency.
3
On appeal in Otis v. SEC,4 preferred stockholders contended that the plan
as approved by the Commission was not "fair and equitable", because, in
allowing participation by common stockholders before preferred stockholders
had been fully compensated according to the charter liquidation provisions,
it violated the "strict priority" rule of Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd5
and cognate cases.6 The Court, however, held that charter liquidation provi-
* American Waterworks and Electric Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7208,
February 17, 1947.
1. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1940). Section 11 (e) provides for voluntary
submission by utility holding companies of reorganization plans and for SEC review to
determine if such plans are "necessary to effectuate" the Act and "fair and equitable,"
Section 11(b) prescribes the standards which plans must meet and empowers the SEC
to issue appropriate enforcement orders, including liquidation or reorganization.
2. 13 S.E.C. 1 (1943), enf'd 51 F. Supp, 217 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd sub nora. Otis
v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1945).
3. Id. at 9. As evidenced earlier in United Light and Power Co., 10 S.EC. 1215
(1942), aff'd sub nor. N.Y. Trust Co. v. S.E.C., 131 F.2d 274 (C.C.A. 2d 1942), this
principle was first evolved in response to protests that 11(e) plans forced by the Act
should not include payment of premiums specified in corporate charters for voluntary re-
demption or liquidation of debentures. Early decisions mainly concerned whether within
terms of corporate charters, such plans were "voluntary" or "involuntary"; ultimately,
the Commission concluded that they were neither, but were outside the scope of charter
terms. North American Light and Power Co., 11 S.E.C. 820 (1942), aff'd sub nora. City
National Bank v. SEC, 134 F.2d 65 (C.C.A. 7th 1943).
4. 323 U.S. 624 (1945).
5. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
6. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941) ; Case v. Los
sions were not conclusive in evaluating the priority of preferred stock be-
cause they were not "applicable" to a corporate readjustment made in com-
pliance with the mandate of a regulatory act not in existence at the time the
security contract was drawn.7 By this rationale the Court avoided any dis-
cussion of the more basic question raised in the case: if the charter liquida-
tion provisions do "apply" in a given situation, may it nevertheless be "fair
and equitable", within the Boyd rule, to adopt some other method of measur-
ing the priority of competing classes of security holders?
Although the Otis rule depends upon a finding that the particular corporate
readjustment is compelled by the Act s there is no authoritative judicial form-
ula for determining whether a given plan was advanced in response to statu-
tory compulsion or was evolved from normal business considerations.'
Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); In re 620 Church Street Bldg.
Corp., 299 U.S. 24 (1936) ; In re Chicago Great Western Ry., 29 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ill.
1939) ; In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1939) ; In re Na-
tional Food Products Corp., 23 F. Supp. 979 (D. Aid. 1938).
7. Considerable disagreement has arisen over the reasoning and holding of the Otis
case. Commissioner Healy, having referred in his dissent in United Light & Power Co,
13 S.E.C. 1, 31 (1943) to "The Supreme Court's premise that in a liquidation and dissolu-
tion compelled by federal law the rights of preferred and common stockholders inter sese
are to be determined by their contract," continued to interpret the Otis rule as an element
in evaluation techniques for reorganizations of "going concerns." See Healy dissenting in
American Light & Traction Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 603, May 7, 1946;
and in American Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 6176, November
1, 1945, insisting that equitable measure of liquidation rights was an innovation in that
case. However, the Otis rule seems definitely to be based in, and to be a rule of, contract
law. See American Power and Light Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 6176, No-
vember 1, 1945; In the Matter of Engineers Public Service Co., D. DcI., May 15, 1947;
In re Interstate Power Co., 71 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Del. 1947). But see p. 48, Northern
States Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5745, April 27, 1945 (dissent) for
a series of quotations illustrating the ambiguity of the Otis opinion.
8. Confusion over the Otis rule has been intensified by refusal to concede that it
rests on statutory compulsion, and by continued adherence to arguments raised by ir.
Chief Justice Stone in his Otis case dissent in which he attacked the holding as a breach
of the reorganization rule of "strict priority' However, the Otis rule concerns measure-
ment of stock rights in contract law as a preliminary to application of the strict priority
rule, which concerns the order of recognizing rights already ascertained. See United
Light & Power Co., 10 S.E.C. 1215, 1223 (1942) ("The rule of absolute priority, applied
by the Supreme Court in the Los Angeles Lumber and Consolidated Rock cases, is not
relevant to the point at issue. The rule does not create rights, but merely requires that
such rights and priorities as the senior claimants possess must be... compensated...
before awards are made to junior claimants"). See also I, re Interstate Power Co., 71 F.
Supp. 164, 169 (D. Del. 1947) ("I have always thought that it serves no useful purpose,
but rather merely tends to confuse the issues to cite cases in the bankruptcy sense, in-
volving the full priority rule, to support certain arguments in cases involving attempts to
comply with the Public Utility Holding Co. Act . . ."). Comment in legal publications
on the Otis case centered on the strict priority rule and gave little attention to the problem
of when the Otis principle applied. See Comment, 54 Y.LE L.J. 840 (1945); Notes, 31
VA. L. Rav. 928 (1945), 57 HARV. L. Ray. 295 (1945), 33 Gao. L.J. 346 (1945).
9. Lack of detailed discussion of the problem by courts or the Commission partly ac-
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From a review of SEC opinions, two theories seem to emerge, furnishing
different bases for effecting this determination. One doctrine appears to
utilize one or more of three criteria to be used to ascertain factually if a read-
justment is advanced under the impact of the Act, or by the kind of corpo-
rate decision contemplated by the charter. In other cases the Commission
appears to have gone beyond the limitations of these criteria, suggesting that
all 11(e) plans are compelled by the Act, and hence that charter liquidation
provisions never should control.
The first of the three criteria, suggested by the Otis case, would hold
liquidation provisions of the charter inapplicable when the proposed corpo-
rate action has been specifically covered by a prior order of the SEC issued
under section 11(b). This concept appears to have been extended to apply
to an 11(e) plan where the only prior order or opinion called generally for
a "substantial resetting"' 0 of the system without specifying the particular
corporate action to be taken."1
In the absence of an SEC order, a second criterion is suggested by cases
in which the charter was held inapplicable because the motive underlying the
Company's proposed system change was satisfaction of the requirements of
the Act.' 2 For example, the SEC miasured participation in an 11(e) plan
counts for the absence of clarity. Such justification for waiving charter provisions as is
given in SEC opinions, is usually contained in a brief paragraph regarding the plan's
"necessity." Similar language, however, is frequently used in reviewing the plan as "fair
and equitable." Factors listed here separately for discussion are frequently considered
simultaneously in SEC opinions.
10. Western Public Service Co., 12 S.E.C. 804, 807 (1943), "As early as July 23,
1941, we made clear our view that the act required a substantial resetting of the Engineers
system .... The proposed reacquisition can not be regarded as an isolated transaction, it
must be viewed with reference to the future scope of its activities." United Public Utilities
Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4625, October 16, 1943 (prior SEC opinion in-
dicated need of general reorganization of System).
11. This rule appears also to apply to actions which are alternative or supplemental to
prior SEC 11(b) orders. See Northern States Power Co., SEC Holding Co, Act Release
No. 5745, April 27, 1945, referring to a prior order and stating, p. 22, "The present plan
is but a further step in the process of bringing the Northern States system into compli-
ance with that section, and these steps must be viewed together." See also American Light
and Traction Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 6603, May 7, 1945, p. 11, ("As has
been indicated, we have consistently held that a plan to be 'necessary' within the mean-
ing of Sections 11(d) and (e) need not be the only plan capable of effectuating the provi-
sions of Section 11(b), but is 'necessary' if it will be a suitable means of achieving re-
sults required thereby.")
12. Consolidated Gas and Electric Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No, 4900, Feb.
ruary 21, 1944, citing other decisions and stating, p. 5, "In each of the cited cases we had
entered an order that the obligor upon the securities involved must be liquidated and dis-
solved by reason of the provisions of Section 11(b) of the Act. We have not, as yet, en-
tered any such order in respect of Consolidated. However, it has been recognized by the
Consolidated management that its capital structure is incompatible with the corporate
simplification standards of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Act. . . ." Laclede Gas Light Co., SEC
Holding Co. Act Release No. 5062, May 24, 1944, p. 26 (rule stated that charter provi-
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on a "fair investment value" basis upon admission by the submitting company
that its reorganization was designed to correct existing Section 11(b) viola-
tions within the utility system and was not primarily dictated by independent
business judgment. 13
Other cases'suggest as a third criterion, that when the means required to
effectuate an 11 (e) plan are derived from the Act or were created by its op-
eration, the SEC may calculate security participation according to the prac-
tice approved in the Otis case. While perhaps not included within the literal
holding of that case, this criterion merely extends its reasoning to place re-
organizations necessitating use of governmental machinery on a par with
those where the government has directly intervened. As a result charter
liquidation provisions do not apply to 11(e) reorganizations which can be
effectuated only through powers vested by the Act in the SEC or the courts,
14
or which require the use of cash surplus15 or voting power1" resulting from
prior changes compelled by the statute.
That inapplicability of liquidation features of security contracts to 11(e)
plans depends upon actual compulsion or impact of the Act as measured by
these criteria was recently stated by two of the Commissioners in separate
opinions. Dissatisfied with the majority opinion's unexplained disregard of
the charter, Commissioner Caffrey described substantially the criteria out-
lined above as tests required for such action and concluded that charter liqui-
dation clauses would control "where liquidation can reasonably be demon-
sions are inapplicable in plais filed "to meet a Section 11(b) order or in anticipation
thereof. . ."). New England Gas and Electric Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No.
6729, June 24, 1946, p. 9 ("As heretofore noted, the stated purpose of the plan now before
us is to effectuate the provisions of Section 11(b) (2) . ..").
13. Southern Colorado Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4501, August
24, 1943, aff'd sub norn., Disman v. SEC, 147 F.2d 679 (C.C.A. 10th 1945); Washington
Railway and Electric Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 6410, February 15, 1946;
Tidewater Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 6407, February 14, 194G [prior
11 (b) order to another part of system concerning same violation of Act, given as motive].
14. Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 (1942); Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
13 S.E.C. 226, 229 (1943) [Otis rule applied although no 11(b) order required action
taken; plan contained request that the SEC "apply to a court.., to enforce its provi-
sions"]; see also American Light & Traction Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No.
6603, May 7, 1945, p. 16 ("For if, aside from the Act, the common stockholders could
liquidate the enterprise ... then the liquidation preference provision of the charter
would be the controlling measure of value.")
15. Western Public Service Co., 12 S.E.C. 804 (1943); Cities Service Co., SEC
Holding Co. Act Release No. 4944, March 15, 1944, p. 16 [no prior 11(b) order, but
"Over $22,000,000 of the cash (needed) . . .consists of proceeds from the sale of its in-
terests ... disposed of as part of its program of compliance with Section 11 and our
orders thereunder"].
16. Northern States Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5745, April 27, 1945,
p. 22, "The preferred stock now has more than two-thirds of the voting power only by
reason of the 1938 recapitalization which was carried out... under the 'fair and equi-
table' standard of Section 11."
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strated to have commended itself to management for reasons not related to
the act."'17
Aside from concurring or minority opinions, however, the language of the
cases does not clearly indicate whether the criteria are used to determine
charter applicability, or to assist in measuring fair investment value under
the assumption that charter provisions never completely control. The equiv-
ocal status of these criteria is illustrated by the El Paso case,' 8 in which Engi-
neers Public Service Company, owner of all the common stock of El Paso,
was attempting to dissolve the latter under the terms of a corporate charter
which did not require payment of a premium to preferred stockholders upon
liquidation. Preferred stockholders opposed the plan, contending that the
fair investment value of their stock exceeded par, and that charter liquidation
provisions should not control. In approving the plan as proposed by Engi-
neers the SEC pointed out that the motive for reorganization was economic
benefit to the system wholly apart from Section 11(b) ; that there was no out-
standing 11(b) order compelling liquidation; and that the means to take
the step were provided in the corporate charter.19 This reasoning may have
been given as a test to demonstrate that this transaction, unlike that in the
Otis case, was a "liquidation" within the purview of the charter which, there-
fore, controlled.2 ° On the other hand, the Commission may have assumed
17. Commissioner Caffrey concurring in Engineers Public Service Co., SEC Holding
Co. Act Release No. 7119, January 9, 1947. Commissioner Hanrahan concurred with Caf-
frey, but stated separately that he believed the "discussion of investment value of the
preferred [in the majority opinion] is wholly unnecessary," in that liquidation was volun-
tary and covered by appropriate charter provisions. The full history of this plan shows
the ephemeral quality of charter provisions. In SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7041,
December 5, 1946, Engineers declared that their 11(e) plan was involuntary, hoping to
gain advantage of the company charter which did not require premiums to be paid in in-
voluntary liquidation. In Release No. 7119 supra the SEC insisted that since the plan was
involuntary, participation would be measured in fair investment value terms aid that the
premium would be paid on an investment value basis. This "valuation" requiring pay-
ment of the premium was set aside, but the holding that charter provisions were not per se
controlling was confirmed. In the Matter of Engineers Public Service Co., D. Del., May
15, 1947.
18. El Paso Electric Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5499, December 15,
1944.
19. The El Paso opinion indicated strongly that liquidation was being governed by
the charter as such: (p. 8) "We regard the proposed transaction as a liquidation within
the meaning of the charter. . . . In the circumstances of this case we are satisfied that
action taken by Engineers to liquidate El Paso will constitute a bona fide exercise of its
voting rights, existing wholly apart from Section 11, and that the proposed liquidation
properly brings into operation the rights and limitations prescribed by the certificate of
incorporation for just such a contingency. The investment interests of the preferred and
common stock are being terminated pursuant to existing contract provisions, and are be-
ing compensated as provided in the contract." No question was raised regarding motive of
the plan, although it appeared to be advanced by desire to adjust unfavorable conditions
resulting from prior working of the Act.
20. Id., at 7, "The proposed liquidation of the company being necessary to effectuate
1424 (Vol. 56
the inapplicability of charter liquidation provisions and advanced these factors
merely as considerations relevant to a measurement of all security rights in
terms of "fair investment value." The latter rationale finds support in the
fact that this part of the opinion follows a discussion of earnings, dividend
rights, and other factors pertinent to valuation.2 1
In other cases, corporate charter liquidation provisions have been dismissed
by the Commission as inapplicable with little explanation beyond the state-
ment that they do not govern in Section 11 plans.? While the detailed history
of the proposals usually discloses one of the above listed criteria, these cases
might be construed as implying a presumption apropos all 11(e) plans. Some
cases, moreover, affirmatively suggest a doctrine in basic conflict with use of
selective criteria.23 For example, although not related to any prior SEC
order or opinion, an 11(e) proposal is considered to be advanced under the
Act's pressure if the action could have been within the scope of an over-all
Section 11(b) order, had such been issued.2 4 Under this concept all 11(e) re-
the provisions of Section 11(b) ... retirement of... stock, therefore, is not an exer-
cise of a privilege by El Paso within the provisions of its certificate of incorporation re-
lating to calls for redemption, and charter provisions ... are not brought into operation.
... [T]hat there is no Section 11(b) (2) order presently outstanding against El Paso
does not alter this rule."
21. Commissioner Healy's concurring opinion and Commissioner McConnaughey's
dissent in the El Paso case suggest from their differing points of view that these two
Commissioners believed the majority to be considering the charter liquidation provisions
as only one of a group of factors in an equitable evaluation of security rights.
22. Consolidated Electric and Gas Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5630, Feb-
ruary 26, 1945 [bonds retired in 11(e) plan without payment of redemption premium al-
though no 11(b) order was outstanding; no reason for waiver of charter given, but plan
was held compelled by the Act]; Great Falls Gas Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No.
4631, October 18, 1943 [11(e) plan approved with participation of preferred and common
stock before full payment to debentures. Record shows plan highly desirable for business
reasons to company, no 11(b) order]; International Utilities Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act
Release No. 4896, February 15, 1944, p. 7 (unqualified statement that "we have repeatedly
held, however, that reorganizations under Section 11 . .. do not operate to mature liqui-
dation claims .. !'; supporting citations sometimes contain recognizable criteria). Al-
though unmentioned, there was a prior 11(b) order in this case, see 13 S.E.C. 226 (1943),
cited supra note 13; General Gas and Electric Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No.
5950, July 26, 1945.
23. American Utilities Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5114, June
22, 1944; Georgia Power and Light Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5563, January
25, 1945; North Continent Utilities Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4626, No-
vember 18, 1943.
24. Northern States Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7148, January 30,
1947, p. 2 ("A Section 11(b) order . .. is merely the Commission's findings ... of
what ultimate objectives need to be attained ... to which plans under Section 11(e) must
be addressed if they are to be approved as 'necessary' . . .") ; Central States Utilities
Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5351, October 14, 1944; Virginia Public Service
Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4618, October 16, 1943, p. 37 ["If the plan is
amended in accord with our findings, it will coincide in most respects with the action ve
would require under Section 11 (b) (2) if we were proceeding independently of the plan";
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organizations would be held to be under the Act's coercion because all plans
filed under Section 11(e) concern standards, which, within the broad area of
administrative discretion, presumably could have been enforced by an 11(b)
order, and in fact must be found "necessary to effectuate the requirements of
the Act" as a prerequisite to SEC approval.2 5
This doctrine does not seem to be derived from the Otis principle, since it
would provide equitable discharge of contracts adjusted or terminated for
reasons not related to government action.26  Such a rule renders useless dicta
the statements in SEC opinions concerning distinctions between 11(e) plans
instigated by business judgment apart from the Act, and those formed by
the SEC or by the companies under an 11(b) order27
The lack of a firm rule for determining charter applicability produced an
impasse in the principal case, American Waterworks and Electric Comtpany 28
in which the proposed self-liquidation scheme included a cash payment to
no 11(b) order here, but approval withheld until plan amended to distribute assets in
shares conflicting with charter preferences.] Engineers Public Service Corp., SEC Hold-
ing Co. Act Release No. 7041, December 5, 1946.
25. While many of the cases cited in notes 22 through 24 sapra suggest that a plan
will be found to be under the impact of the Act if it can be called "necessary" in being
initially reviewed by the SEC, other opinions seem to suggest an even more lax rule;
Midland Utilities Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7054, December 14, 1946, p. 20
("It thus seems clear that Section 11(q) permits a company to propose particular trans-
actions which under our ordinary practice we would not, or perhaps in any event could
not, specifically require by order under Section 11(b). Since we are dealing with a plan
filed under Section 11(e), we need not consider precisely what might be ordered under
Section 11 (b) . . .but need merely consider whether the plan as filed . . .is necessary to
effectuate the provisions of Section 11(b), i.c., appropriate . . .") ; Standard Gas and
Electric Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5070, May 31, 1944 [power to modify se-
curity rights stated not to depend on prior 11 (b) order, but to be applicable in voluntary
plans at the SEC's discretion].
26. 6 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS §§ 1759, 1938-9 (Rev. Ed. 1938), after recognizing
that contracts interrupted by statutory compulsion should be discharged without lia-
bility, states that details regarding interruption by administrative agencies are not clearly
established. Section 1967A suggests that such compulsion must be the effective element
in ending the contract to justify waiver of liability under the contract's terms.
27. Other SEC opinions suggest no material difference exists between voluntary and
involuntary action. Commonwealth and Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138, 165-6 (1942),
"We adhere to our remarks in those cases, which are to the effect that compliance with
Section 11(b) may frequently be best accomplished by voluntary action .... Indeed,
compulsion along broad and general lines, such as that inherent in our proposed order, is
not inconsistent with but is designed to precipitate voluntary plans defining the methods
and processes to be used in complying with the mandate of the statute."; Electric Bond
and Share Co., 11 S.E.C. 1146, 1208-16 (1942). See also SEN. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 58-60 (1935), "Voluntary action by Companies should be encouraged as much
as possible, but the Commission should be empowered to issue orders compelling neces-
sary divestments, dissolutions, and reorganizations . . . the devices ... to effect that
continual pressure to compel that continual dismantling process. .. ."
28. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7208, February 17, 1947. For earlier opinions
concerning this case see Releases 7091, December 24, 1946; and 7171, January 31, 1947,
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preferred holders of the par %alue of their stock, the amount specified in the
charter liquidation provisions. As in the El Paso case, the preferred stock-
holders objected to the plan on the ground that the charter provisions should
not measure the value of their priority.2 Despite American's insistence that
the proposal was advanced apart from the Act, the SEC refused to approve
the plan as "fair and equitable." To avoid delay a compromise was reached,
providing for an immediate payment of the amount specified in the charter
and the establishment of a $2,200,000 escrow fund to insure payment of any
additional amount the SEC might finally determine to be due.2" The manage-
ment reserved the right to contest any final finding by the SEC and the
amount to be paid to the preferred stock remains to be decided.
From further consideration of the principal case it appears that the criteria
previously suggested are not satisfied. First, instead of an order or opinion
compelling liquidation, there is a prior SEC opinion, issued in 1937,31 stating
that continued existence of American, including the water enterprises whose
elimination motivated this liquidation, was satisfactory under the Act.a
Secondly, the purpose or motive of American's proposal does not seem to
show compulsion of the Act. In this connection the company testified that
29. Controversy centered over amount to be paid the 199,66 shares of $5 preferred
stock. The corporate charter provided that in the event of any liquidation or dissolution
of the corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary, the holders of outstanding first
preferred stock should be entitled to $100 per share. The stock was redeemable at the
corporation's option at $110. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7171, January 31, 1947.
30. While the SEC did not contend the $10 redemption premium should be paid per
se, the escrow amount was openly calculated at $10 per share plus administrative ex-
.penses. For an interesting comment on validity of such "calculations" see Northern State
Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5745, April 27, 1945 (dissent).
31. American Waterworks and Electric Co., 2 S.E.C. 973 (1937). Within the
broad range of an administrative agency's discretion this decision could be recalled by the
SEC and a new finding issued holding discontinuance of the system's water enterprises
to be necessary. Section 11(b) of the Act states, "The Commission may by order revoke
or modify any order previously under this sub-section, if, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, it finds that the conditions upon which the order was predicated do not exist:'
See North American Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5657, March 15, 1945;
Northern States Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 6937, November 9, 1946.
Logically, such a new order could hardly be considered effective compulsion to take ac-
tion which the Company had already voluntarily proposed to do. But see Northern
States Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7148, January 30, 1947, in which
the SEC states that upon issuance of an 11(b) order duplicating an 11(e) plan which
the SEC had previously approved, the action proposed by the company becomes com-
pelled by the Act.
32. While the original 1937 order provided for internal adjustments Vithin the
structure of the gas, electric and transportation system, including liquidation of its top
holding company as a necessary step to comply with provisions of §11(b), the current
plan is not proposed as an alternative or substitute to that order; and the Company has
stated and the SEC agreed that further plans for the necessary internal adjustments
within this system will be forthcoming. Brief for American Waterworks and Electric
Co. (1946).
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the continued existence of American as head-holding company over two sub-
sidiary holding companies (one dealing in water only and the other dealing
in gas, electricity, and transportation) was no longer desirable since for
business reasons the management had decided to dispose of all of the sys-
tem's water enterprises 3  Finally there is no basis for holding that the means
proposed to effectuate the liquidation involved reliance on the Act,a4 since
American originally proposed that after SEC approval, liquidation would pro-
ceed according to charter provisions and pertinent state law.
The American Waterworks case is important because it presents squarely
the problem of the applicability of charter liquidation provisions in Holding
Company Act reorganizations. Sinde none of the three criteria previously
suggested is present, a decision that American's preferred stockholders should
receive the liquidation amount specified in the charter will support the theory
that charter provisions control, absent a factual showing of statutory com-
pulsion in the particular case. Experience has demonstrated that this re-
quires, in many cases, a hair-splitting analysis of the motives underlying the
promulgation of a plan by the corporate management-an almost impossible
task for even the most expert of administrative bodies. On the other hand,
measuring the preferred participation in terms of "fair investment value"
will affirm the theory that the mere existence of the Act offers sufficient com-
pulsion to invoke the Otis case doctrine of measuring the priority of pre-
ferred stock without being exclusively bound by the liquidation features of
the charter. Although adoption of this second alternative will obviate the
difficulties imposed by the first, it may lead one to question the logic of treat-
ing preferred stockholders differently in Holding Company Act reorganiza-
33. American is head company over the West Penn. Electric Co., which controlled
the system's gas, electric and transportation companies, and over Waterworks Holding
Co. which controlled only water companies. While American actually controlled some
water companies directly, these were to have been transferred to Waterworks Holding
Co. under a separate plan, leaving American with direct ownership in the two subsidiary
holding companies only. Brief for American Waterworks and Electric Co. (1946).
34. Neither funds nor voting power existing as a result of the Act are to be used
in this liquidation. Sale of the system's waterworks assets will produce the required
funds; and as required under applicable state law (Delaware), the original plan provided
for submission to the common stockholders for approval.
35. In this connection, it should be noted that § l1(e) provides that ' , . the Com-
mission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the provi-
sions of subsection (f) of section 18 ... to enforce and carry out the ...plan." Since
such a request on its face is voluntary, it should not be held to bring a plan under the im-
pact of the Act. Only when a plan actually cannot be effected without such aid would use
of power of the act seem to furnish that degree of statutory compulsion justifying waiver
of charter provisions. This is important in view of the SEC's policy of encouraging coin-
panies to request aid in enforcing 11(e) plans, Mississippi River Power Co., SEC Holding
Co. Act Release No. 5776, May 5, 1945; Kings County Lighting Co., SEC Holding Co. Act
Release No. 7060, December 14, 1946 [refusing approval of 11(e) plan unless amended
to include request for SEC and court aid in enforcing plan; original plan was to be
effected by state law and charter requirement].
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tions than in reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act. The idea that a
proposal is any more compulsory because undertaken within the framework
of the former statute, rather than the latter, hardly stands analysis. Nor is it
any more persuasive to contend that corporate charters drafted in the 'twenties
"contemplated" a reorganization under provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
first adopted in 1934, but not a reorganization under the Holding Company
Act, promulgated in 1935. The ultimate problem, in seeking fair and equi-
table plans under either statute, is the determination of the extent to which
holders of senior securities are to be compensated for their actual loss of
priority. Whether the measurement is made according to the appropriate
terms of the corporate charter or on the basis of "fair investment value," it
is difficult to see any reason for applying different standards in the two situa-
tions.
PROFIT-SHARING BONUSES AS PART OF THE OVERTIME
BASE UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT*
Under Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,' an em-
ployee engaged in interstate commerce - may work more than forty hours per
week only if paid one and one-half times the "regular rate at which he is em-
ployed" for each hour of overtime3  In Walling v. Garlock Pacling Co., the
Second Circuit recently ruled that an employer's payments to its employees
under a profit-sharing bonus plan are part of the employees' "regular rate" of
compensation within the meaning of the statute, a holding particularly signifi-
cant because of its applicability to the enormous number of profit-sharing
plans instituted during the war years.5 It would seem to subject sponsors of
* Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F.2d 44 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 67
Sup. Ct. 1310 (1947).
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 at seq. (1940) (hereinafter referred to as
the FLSA).
2. For discussion of this term as used in the FLSA, see Davisson, Coterage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 41 Micn. L. REv. 1060 (1943), 43 Micn. L. Ray. E67 (1945);
Note, 55 YAL.E L. J. 421 (1946).
3. Latitude for industries operating intensively only during short periods is afforded
by §§ 7(b) (c) and 13. See 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §207 ct scq. (1940).
4. 159 F.2d 44 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 1310 (1947).
5. This note is concerned primarily with profit-sharing bonus plans, through which
the employee receives direct payments determined by the profits, as distinguished from the
trust arrangement, where the employer contributes either a percentage of the profits or a
stipulated sum to a fund from which employees later receive benefits. The latter device is
most commonly used for pension plans.
No accurate measure is available of the number of profit-sharing bonus plans in exist-
ence. Indicative of the growth in popularity of the profit-smring concept, however, are
the cumulative figures on all types of plans in P-H PEtesio, AN1D Proprr-SuAwxuG Senv.
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many such programs to suits by their workers claiming that overtime com-
pensation paid them was calculated on an insufficient base and demanding the
liquidated double damages which the FLSA provides.0
While infinite variations on the basic theme have been developed,7 the
typical profit-sharing plan distributes to employees direct payments deter-
mined by the size of the firm's profits, the worker's seniority and similar fac-
tors. The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, enforce-
ment agency of the FLSA, has made regularity of bonus payments its primary
criterion of the Act's applicability to profit-sharing plans, asserting that where
"the payment and the amount of the bonus are solely in the discretion of the
employer"--e.g. a cash Christmas gift-the payment is not part of the over-
time base.8 But, the Division maintains, where the employer "promises,
11902.1 (1946) and the annual report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the
number of trust plans approved under § 165 of the Internal Revenue Code. Rr. ColmM'R
INT. REv. 22 (1945) and 28 (1946).
"It would be unrealistic not to recognize that the high wartime profits and corporate
tax rates, accompanied by high individual rates together with wartime wage and salary
contr6ls, have contributed to this enormous growth ... ." Cann, Holt, the Commissiotic
Handles Pension Plans, 23 TAxEs 918 (1945).
As was done by the employer in the instant case, full tax deduction may be taken on
profit-sharing bonuses as a normal business expense. INr. REv. CoDE § 23(a). ee Mo-
line Dispatch Publishing v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 934 (1928) ; Commercial Electrical
Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 986 (1927). The demarcation between deductible
and taxable, so far as trust plans are concerned, is drawn by § 165 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 53 STAT. 67 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 165 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 862 (1942), 26
U.S.C. § 165 (Supp. 1946).
Continuation of the profit-sharing bonus plans now in existence and institution of new
ones would seem to depend considerably on prolongation of the present economic boom.
See BALDERSTON, PROFIT-SHARING FOR WAGE EARNERS 9, 31-2 (1937). That pension and
similar trust programs are somewhat hardier is evidenced by study of their record under
the impact of the 1929-32 depression, 2 LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTE ,ts 841-76
(1932). Efforts to increase the durability of trust plans have led to introduction of the
profit-sharing principle by varying employer contributions across the business cycle, thus
permitting maximum tax deductible contributions in highly profitable years and complete
suspension in poor years.
6. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1940). Suit to recover damages may
be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction, but while the original Act permitted
a variety of representative actions, suit may now, under the amendment to § 16(b) made
by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, be brought only by an employee, with other em-
ployees permitted to be represented as parties plaintiff bnly on giving written consent,
Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(a) (May 14, 1947).
7. Illustrative of the ingenious modifications which have been made on the basic
model is the plan in the instant case. Balderston, op. cit. supra note 5, at 71-131, catalogues
93 separate plans, each tailored to the requirements of its sponsor.
8. Bonus Payments, Wage and Hour Div. Press Release, No. A-13, Feb. 5, 1945.
Determination of whether a sum paid an employee is compensation or a "gift" arises in
numerous contexts other than that of the FLSA. Indeed, the Administrator ruled on the
status of employer contributions to pension funds, see infra note 37, by accurately para-
phrasing a section of the Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 639 (1935), 26 U.S.C. § 1426(a)
(1940). And in considering whether certain bonuses were such an integral part of the
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agrees or arranges to pay a bonus" the size of which is fixed or determinable
mathematically, the amount paid must be regarded as part of the "regular rate"
of compensation. 9
Although there has been much litigation of Section 7 (a) 's applicability to
incentive bonus arrangements,-' the Garlock case is the first to test the full
extent of the Division's stand on profit-sharing." In 1937, defendant cor-
poration promulgated a plan under which each hourly-paid employee re-
ceived a quarterly cash bonus equal to the concurrent dividend on a certain
number of shares of stock. The number of fictitious shares allocated varied
wage structure that failure to pay them violated the wage freeze of E.xec. Order 9250,
7 F.R. 7871 (1942), the Chairman of the War Labor Board forecast an aspect of the ra-
tionale of the instant case, saying: ". .. the employee's conception of his vage ... arises
not only from the obligatory practice of the employer, but from the latter's voluntary acts
as well .... To the e.i-tent that the employer by repeated voluntary action has raised the
reasonable expectations of his employee he has fettered his own discretion. An element of
compulsion, albeit self-imposed compulsion, necessarily emerges which governs the em-
ployer in the continued exercise of his discretion." Nineteen Hundred Corp., 12 WAn
LABOR REPoRTs 417, 418 (1943).
9. Bonus Payments, Wage and Hour Div. Press Release, No. A-13, Feb. 5, 1945.
10. Rulings were obtained from the Supreme Court in two cases decided simultane-
ously, Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U. S. 419, and Walling v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427 (1945). In the former, the employee was paid on an
hourly basis unless his earnings computed on a piece-work formula were greater, in which
case he received the latter sum. The employment contract provided for time and one-half
for overtime if the worker were paid at the hourly rate, but stipulated that the piece-work
payments covered both straight time and overtime. The Court, granting the requested in-
junction, found that the piece-work rate Awas actually the "regular rate," inasmuch as the
hourly rate bore no relation to the payments normally received by the employee. The
Harnischfeger case, also a victory for the Administrator, differed primarily in that its re-
sult required the employer to include bonuses paid for meeting production goals when vir-
tually all employees did so.
The touchstone of these decisions would seem to be that § 7(a) is violated by the
establishment of a wage rate not related to the employee's actual income as a basis for
overtime. It might be expected that a corollary of this rule would be that an employee
whose working hours vary above and below the statutory maximum must receive additional
pay for weeks in which his work exceeds forty hours. In Walling v. Belo Corp., 316 U. S.
624 (1942), however, the Court held valid a plan antithetical to this proposition. Under
the Belo scheme, the employee was paid on an hourly basis. But regardless of the number
of hours worked, he was guaranteed a flat sum weekly, usually 60 times the hourly figure,
with a proviso that the flat payment covered both regular time and overtime. The result
was that (at the time the statutory maximum work-week was 44 hours) the employee had
to work 543/ hours before becoming entitled to any pay above his weekly guarantee.
Recently reaffirming the Belo decision, the Court endeavored to refute its alleged
contradiction of later doctrine but finally retreated to the veneration due aged precedents
not legislatively disavowed, concluding: "Even if we doubted the wisdom of the Belo de-
cision as an original proposition, we should not be inclined to depart from it at this time."
Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1947). See
Feldman, Algebra and the Supreme Court, 40 ILL. L. REv. 489 (1946).
11. The Division had prevailed in an earlier case involving a monthly bonus scheme.
Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 F.2d 780 (C.C.A. 2d 1946), cert. denied, 328
U. S. 870 (1946).
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with the worker's length of service, but full payment depended on his having
worked forty hours weekly during the quarter for which the dividend was
declared. Should the employee have worked fewer than forty hours during
any week, he received such proportion of the bonus as his average number of
hours worked weekly bore to forty. Overtime work added nothing to the
size of the payment.
The Wage and Hour Administrator sought to enjoin operation of the plan,
asserting that exclusion of payments under it from the "regular rate" vio-
lated Section 7 (a) and that to permit this exclusion would lead to evasion
of the statutory requirements through payment of lower hourly rates supple-
mented by periodic bonuses . 2 Recognizing that the exact amount of any par-
ticular bonus could not be determined by the employee prior to declaration of
the dividend, 13 and that any payment was, therefore, ex post facto compensa-
tion, the Second Circuit nonetheless reversed the District Court'4 and re-
manded for the issuance of an injunction. Speaking for the court, Clark, J.,11
employed the pragmatic test laid down by the Supreme Court in Walling v.
Youngerman-Reynold. Hardwood Co.: "The regular rate . .,. is not an ar-
bitrary label chosen by the parties; it is an actual fact."'u Although that case
might have been distinguished on the ground that it involved an incentive-
bonus plan under which the zealous employee received his premium as part of
his weekly paycheck,"' Judge Clark ignored the distinction and held that the
employee's knowledge of the bonus and his certainty of benefit under it were
such inducements to employment as to be determinative of the plan's com-
pensatory nature. In like fashion, the court denied defendant's argument
that the plan lacked regularity in that it was subject to withdrawal at any
12. In view of the Garlock plan's inception before the passage of the Act and the
consequent difficulty of proving attempted circumvention of the statute, the Administrator
made no attempt to show bad faith. No such demonstration has been considered necessary
by the Supreme Court. See Wailing v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427 (1945), Wal-
ling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 (1945).
13. The dividend rate varied between $.25 'and $1.25 per share but for three years
prior to institution of the action was fixed at $.50.114. Since the payment of any bonus depended on the declaration of a dividend, an
action wholly discretionary with the company's directors, the District Court had found
that any bonus paid was more gift than compensation. Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 18
LAB. REL. REP. (6 Wage & Hour Cases) 46 (S. D. N. Y. 1946). Judge Clark made clear
the illusory nature of such discretion, saying: ". . . the passing of a dividend is so grave
a confession of financial weakness that it is unthinkable that defendant's directors would
take that action just to pass a bonus payment." Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F.2d
44, 45 (1947).
15. Augustus N. Hand, J., joined in the opinion. Swan, J., "reluctantly" concurred
separately, noting that authoritative decisions precluded adoption of his personal belief
that the profit shares should be treated as gifts. Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F.2d
44,47 (1947).
16. 325 U. S. 419, 424 (1945).
17. See note 10 supra.
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time, pointing out that all but contractual wages are subject to termination.29
The prospective effect of the decision is to require defendant, if it wishes
to continue the plan in operation, to modify it by allotting stock on the basis
of overtime as well as regular time. While at first impression this would
seem to call for repetitive calculation of overtime,10 the Administrator has
pointed out that the aim can be achieved by basing any bonus or profit share
on a percentage of each employee's net earnings, in which ease the bonus it-
self would include both straight time and overtime.^
18. Authority for the court's refusal to consider the power of withdrawal as negativ-
ing regularity vas Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 F2d 7S0 (C.C.A. 2d
1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946), where defendant had paid pre-arranged bonuses
monthly, subject to withdrawal, but Frank, J., had said: . . the undenied, crucial fact
here is that in fact they were regularly paid." Id. at 784.
Making dear that the employer had benefited from the profit-sharing plan as he
would have from any pay raise, Judge Clark also struck down defendant's contention that
the bonus should not be considered compensation since it depended on neither time worked
nor production.
19. On the ground that employer, having paid overtime and wishing to pay a bonus,
would then have to recalculate the overtime worked to make allowance for the additional
compensation. Viewing this as the sole possible method, the court in Walling v. Frank
Adam Electric Co., 66 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Mo. 1946) stigmatized the Administrator
for requiring an employer to "... march down the hill, start the overtime process all
over and march back up.. ."
20. Bonus Payments, Wage and Hour Div. Press Release No. A-13, Feb. 5, 1945.
E.g., in the case of an employee working 50 hours weekly at a "regular rate" of $1.0
per hour, the total wage is calculated:
Straight time pay: 40 hrs. at $1.00--$40.00
Overtime pay: 10 hrs. at 1.50- 15.00
Total wage: $55.00
Assuming that the employer wishes to pay employees a bonus of 10% on their earn-
ings, it is violative of the FLSA to base it on straight time exclusively:
Straight time pay: 40 hrs. at $1.0--$40.00
Bonus of 107 of straight time pay: 4.00
Overtime pay: 10 hrs. at 1.50- 15.00
Total wage (illegal) : $59.00
Instead, the bonus must be based on overtime as well as regular time. This can be
done by repetitive calculation of overtime:
Straight time pay: 40 hrs. at $.00--,0.00
Overtime pay: 10 hrs. at 1.50- 15.00
Total initial payment: $55.00
Plus 10% of regular pay: 4.00
Recomputation of overtime based on
$1.10 hourly wage: 1.50
Total over-all payment: $60.50
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The decision may be regarded, evidently, as judicial approval of the Ad-
ministrator's interpretation of Section 7(a), i'n which "regularity" is the
basic determinant of the need to include profit-sharing additions to the base
wage in computing the "regular rate." 2' 1 Motivated by considerations of ad-
ministrative efficiency, the Wage and Hour Division has declared that for
purposes of enforcement its fundamental criterion of "regularity" will be
payment of bonuses at quarterly or more frequent intervals ;-- but if "regu-
larity" is the key, it would seem that bonuses paid at any interval might par-
take of -this quality.2
Although suits by the Administrator to enjoin plans where payments are
made less frequently than quarterly are apparently precluded, there seem few
legal obstacles to actions by employees for damages. This distinction arises
from the legislative history of Sections 9 and 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act
of 1947,24 which afford an employer a good defense if he can prove good faith
compliance with an administrative enforcement policy. According to the re-
port of the conference committee,2 5 action by the Administrator is barred
where his conduct has led the employer to believe that no suit will be insti-
tuted by the United States; but the defense is available against an employee's
suit only where the employer believed in good faith, as a result of the enforce-
ment policy, that his action was not a violation of the FLSA." The Divi-
,sion's announced intention to limit enforcement action to profit-sharing plans
of quarterly or more frequent interval contains specific notice that it is not
meant to preclude suits by employees attacking plans where bonuses are paid
But, by the Administrator's method, the same result can be reached by calculating the
bonus on the employee's net earnings, thus saving the recomputation of overtime necessary
under the method used above:
Regular pay: 40 hrs. at $1.00--$40.00
Overtime pay: 10 hrs. at 1.50- 15.00
Total initial payment: $55.00
Bonus of 10% of total initial payment 5.50
Total over-all payment: $60.50
21. Ibid.
22. "Such considerations as the recognized bookkeeping difficulty confronting em-
ployers in allocating a bonus paid less often than once each quarter to the hours in which
the bonus was earned, the time-consuming burden placed upon the inspection staff when
confronted with the task of making such allocations and the benefit to employees of hav-
ing a current knowledge of the hourly rate upon which their overtime will be calculated
motivate this administrative policy.' Ibid.
23. A plan involving monthly payment of 25% of a company's profits to its employees,
with payment of any residue at the end of the year, was recently enjoined by the Sixth
Circuit in a decision which favorably cites the instant case. Walling v. Wall Wire Prod-
ucts Co., 161 F.2d 470 (C.C.A. 6th 1947),
24. Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 14, 1947).




less often.3 So definite a caveat would almost certainly, in a suit by an em-
ployee, negate a defense based on reliance in good faithi upon the Adminis-
trator's policy.2s The broad language employed by the court makes equally
unlikely, in future cases, a successful attempt by an employer to limit the
Garlock doctrine to its specific facts.
That the Garlock rule will eventually be extended to cover most profit-
sharing plans may, in consequence, scarcely be doubted. But it need not be
anticipated that modification of existing plans to comply with the rule will be
accomplished only after litigation of a substantial number of employee suits
for damages. The Portal-to-Portal Act imposes a two-year-maximum Stat-
ute of Limitations on all actions arising under the FLSA31 and places strin-
gent restrictions on the liquidated damages clause,3' thus striking at the profit-
ability of actions for unpaid overtime. From the paucity of suits of this type
filed by employees even prior to the enactment of these statutory handicaps3 2
it may be inferred that the few unions33 concerned would rather rely on bar-
27. "This enforcement policy, of course, does not and cannot affect the independent
right of employees under Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act to bring their
own suits to recover wages that are due them." Bonus Payments, Wage and Hour Div.
Press Release, No. A-13, Feb. 5, 1945.
28. Possible, however, is treatment of the Administrator's varning as valueless dicta
-inasmuch as the FLSA, prior to the Portal-to-Portal Act, gave him no binding interpre-
tive power-in which event, proof of reliance in good faith v-ould be greatly facilitated.
29. Perhaps most indicative of the tenor of the opinion is the conclusion that to per-
mit the plan "would give defendant an advantage over competitors in labor costs derived
not from efficiency of utilization of labor, but from differences in details of draftsmanship
in their respective bonus plans." Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F.2d 44, 46 (1947).
30. Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (May 14, 1947). Suits brought under
the FLSA in state courts prior to the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act were sub-
ject to the applicable state Statute of Limitations, Cannon v. Miller, 22 Vash2d 227, 155
P.2d 500 (1945) ; see Walsh v. 515 Madison Ave. Corp., 181 Misc. 219, 42 N.Y.S2d 262
(Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd 793 N.Y. 826, 59 N.E2d 183 (1944) ; as were actions brought in
a federal court, Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 146 F.2d 279 (C.C.A. 9th 1944) (by implication) ;
see Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 161 F.2d 83, 85 (C.C.A. 5th 1947).
But a state statute aimed specifically at the FLSA is unconstitutional, violating the su-
premacy clause and denying equal protection of the laws. Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock
& Shipbuilding Co., supra.
31. Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (May 14, 1947). Courts trying suits for
unpaid overtime may in their discretion deny liquidated damages, see note 6 supra, if the
employer shows that his action was taken in good faith and on reasonable grounds. Pro-
tection is thus given the employer who cannot demonstrate reliance on an administrative
ruling, see discussion in text, supra, p. 1434, but who had other valid reasons for his belief.
32. Despite the virtual invitation to sue for damages extended by the Administrator in
his release on bonus plans, supra, note 27, in only one recorded case has an employee filed
a suit definitely based on a profit-sharing plan. Adams v. Macklin Co., 69 F. Supp. 262
(E.D. Mich. 1946). Defendant's motion for judgment was granted, plaintiff apparently
having neglected to note the Administrator's ruling that bonuses based on total earnings
comply with the Act.
33. Profit-sharing plans have long been anathema to the great majority of organized
labor. See Balderston, op. cit. supra note 5, at 14-7, and Hearings before Committee o
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gaining to accomplish long-term gains than seek swift but transitory triumphs
through legal action, while unorganized employees might well consider the re-
vocable nature of most plans34 before commencing attack on them. Finally,
-it is doubtful that suits based on future violations will arise, in view of the
ease with which plans may be modified to comply with the FLSA.3 5
In addition to its applicability to profit-sharing, the Garlock definition of
"compensation" 'has conjectural implications for vacation and holiday pay and
employer contributions to employee retirement, sickness, hospitalization and
death benefit plans.8 6 The Administrator does not regard such payments as
"compensation," declaring that "since the benefits . . . are payable only at a
time when the employee performs no work, the employer's contributions . , .
may be regarded as compensation for hours not worked." 3  In the Garlock
decision, however, the court specifically rejected the argument that a sum
paid, and expected by, an employee at a date removed from the date of his
work must be regarded as a mere "gift" solely because of its separation, in
point of time, from a specific workweek. Rather, the court declared in effect
that the return to an employee for his work, however denominated, is wages.08
Such reasoning, relentlessly pursued, would denounce as specious an attempt
to term any consideration regularly and by arrangement passing between em-
ployer and employee anything other than "compensation," whether in the
form of cash in hand or deferred payments.
Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, however, suits based
1pon this extension of the Garlock doctrine D are seemingly doomed. The
Finance ptrsuant to S. Res. 215, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 104-9, 189-99 (1938) (statements by
William Green and John L. Lewis). Primary bases for this sentiment are the employ-
ment of profit-sharing to forestall unionization or to encourage company unions, the use of
shared profits as an apology for below-scale wages, and labor suspicion of management's
custody of the books. See Balderston, op. Ch. supra note 5, at 12.
34. 'Except in the rare instances where profit-sharing plans result from collective bar-
gaining, Walling v. Wall Wire Products Co., 161 F.2d 470 (C. C. A. 6th 1947), or are
included in collective agreements, Adams v. Macklin Co., 69 F. Supp. 262 (E. D. Mich.
1946), they are revocable at the employer's wish, a point which has been unsuccessfully
urged as indicative of their status as "gifts.' Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F.2d
44 (C. C. A. 2d 1947); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 F.2d 780 (C. C. A.
2d 1946).
35. See note 20 supra.
36. These plans are commonly operated through insurance companies or independent
trust funds, employers and employees contributing jointly to the payments. See note 5
supra. For detailed treatment of such plans, see LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION SYSTEMS
(1932).
37. Employer's Part in Pensions Need Not Affect Regular Rate of Pay, Wage and
Hour Div. Press Release No. R-1743, Feb. 12, 1942. Exclusion of contributions from the
"regular rate" is permitted only so long as the employee does not have the option to re-
ceive direct cash payments in lieu of the funds paid into the plan and provided he may not
assign the benefits or receive a cash consideration upon termination of his interest.
38. Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., 159 F.2d 44, 46 (1947).
39. No case has yet been recorded on this point. Cf. Social Security Board v, Nie-
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Wage and Hour Division's stand on this type of compensation, 0 quite unlike
the efficiency-dictated enforcement policy on profit-sharing, is a substantive
interpretation of the FLSA that contains no warning of possible attack by
employees, thus making quite credible an employer's allegation of reliance in
good faith.
While perhaps unjustifiable in terms of absolute logical consistency, and
certainly entirely fortuitous so far as the voiced intent of Congress is con-
cerned,4 1 the foreseeable consequences of blending the Portal-to-Portal Act
and the FLSA as interpreted in the Garlock case need scarcely be regarded
as undesirable. Compliance is obtained with the mandate of the FLSA to the
point where profit-sharing as a device for circumventing the statute is ren-
dered valueless. Beyond that point, in the comparable areas of pensions and
vacation payments, the employee is left to secure whatever benefits he may
obtain either individually or collectively, with small danger that contracts thus
negotiated will be attempted evasions of the FLSA by the self-seeking em-
ployer.
The necessity of invoking the deus ex inachina of the Portal-to-Portal Act
to resolve these potential problems does, however, underscore heavily the
fundamental inadequacy of the prevailing judicial approach to cases arising
under Section 7(a). Doctrinaire application of the formulae evolved to de-
termine the "regular rate" has resulted in decisions permitting an employer
to violate the spirit of the FLSA although technically complying with its
terms.43 Similarly, in contravention of the FLSA's intended integration with
the National Labor Relations Act,4 grasping employees have been allowed to
prosecute successfully suits for unpaid overtime based on collateral payments
rotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946); McMillan v. Wilson & Co., 212 Mim. 142, 2 N.W.2d 833
(1942).
40. Employer's Part in Pensions Need Not Affect Regular Rate of Pay, Wage and
Hour Div. Press Release, No. R-1743, Feb. 12, 1942.
41. The legislative histories of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act nowhere indi-
cate Congress' intent to legislate regarding profit-sharing or pension plans.
42. Had the Administrator, presumably in the most advantageous position for dis-
covering illegal schemes, believed that pensions and vacation payments were being used to
violate the Act, it may be assumed that he would have acted to prevent such circumven-
tion.
43. See Walling v. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624 (1942) and Walling v. Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1056 (1947), discussed note 10 supra.
44. 49 STAT. 449. (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1940). Evidence of this intention is found
in § 7(b) (1) and (2) of the FLSA, 52 STAT. 1063 (1933), 29 U.S.C. §207 (1940). Al-
though the tumultuous legislative history of the FLSA precludes any definite statement on
the degree to which Congress desired to interweave the tw%,'o statutes, sce Jewell Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 163, 175-0 (1945), the record is studded with
statements expressing the concern of both houses over the need for reconciliation. Sce,
e.g., SEN. REP. No. 8M4, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1937) ; 83 CONG. Rrc. 7235, 7290, 7291
(1938) ; 82 CozG. REc. 1391, 1395 (1937) ; 81 CoNG. Rnc. 7650 (1937).
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made in accordance with collectively bargained agreements entered into in
good faith by employers and unions.4 5
Such aberrational consequences of conceptual approach to essentially fac-
tual problems could be avoided were the courts to consider, in determining
the "regular rate," the motives underlying the scheme of compensation and
the mechanism by which it is achieved. On this basis, the merely facile word-
ing of an employer's ex parte attempt to circumvent the FLSA would not
make its 'approval mandatory,46 while determination of the conditions of em-
ployment, once minimum standards are achieved, could be left to collective
bargaining 7 I
With the Portal-to-Portal Act, Congress moved quickly to extricate itself
from one predicament caused by judicial interpretation of the "regular rate."
Should the courts remain adamant in their doctrinaire attitude, further legis-
lation may be necessary, directed not at one specific consequence of that ap-
proach, but at the approach itself.
ATTORNEY VERSUS ACCOUNTANT: A PROFESSIONAL
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE IN THE FIELD OF
INCOME TAX PRACTICE*
Jurisdictional disputes are not exclusively the problem of labor. Adjust-
ment of professional areas of interest may be no less vexatious. The vigorous
45. Aaron v. Bay Ridge Operating Co., 162 F.2d 665 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), reversing
Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 69 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) ; Ferren v. Water-
man S. S. Corp., 70 F. Supp. 1 (D. P. R. 1947). In the Aaron case, plaintiff, asking un-
paid overtime, claimed that (1) where a union contract provided for overtime pay to begin
after 36 hours of work, the premium to the fortieth hour should be considered part of the
"regular rate"; and (2) where the same contract provided for the overtime rate to be
paid for all work done at night, the overtime rate should be considered the "regular rate."
Ruling for the defendant in the district court, Judge Rifkind held that collectively bar-
gained agreements take precedence over pedantic interpretation of the FLSA, having
"freedom to move unhampered above the floor -that the F.L.S.A. establishes." Addison v.
Huron Stevedoring Corp., supra at 959. At the trial, Joseph B. Ryan, president of the
International Longshoremen's Association, testified for the defendant that his union op.
posed the suit "as it might wipe out all of the gains we had made for our men over a pe-
riod of 25 years."
46. For an apt excoriation of the Supreme Court's willingness to accept verbalistic
compliance with the FLSA, see Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in Walling v. Belo Corp.,
316 U. S. 624, 635 (1942).
47. The Supreme Court's refusal to accept collectively bargained contracts as deter-
minative of the rights of the parties, Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. R. v. Muscoda L. No. 123, 321
U.S. 590, 602 (1944), wag seemingly one of the reasons for enactment of the Portal-to-
Portal Act. Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1-2 (May 14, 1947).
* New York County Lawyers Association v. Bercu, 188 Misc. 406, 69 N. Y. S. 2d
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campaign of the American Bar Association to stamnp out the unauthurized
practice of law by laymen1 has not been directed solely against depredations
by unlicensed "quack" practitioners, but has also sought to delimit the spheres
of activities of responsible professions and quasi-professions which engage
daily in tasks bearing close relation to legal matters.2 Particularly controver-
sial has been the problem of delineating the relative status of the lawyer and
730 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Compare 13 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEws, No. 2 at 18 (1947), with 83
JoURNAL OF AcCOUNTANcY 453 (1947) re the principal case.
1. The following are among the outstanding sources of general information on the
subject of illegal practice of law and the drive to suppress it: AM.MucAz BAn Associ-
ATION, CO]MPENDIUM ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF THE LAW (1942) (cited "CosrN-
DIUM"); BRAND, UNAUTHORIZED PRAcrcE DECISIONS (1937); CnExTnAII, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1938); COHEN, THE LAW: BusinEss an Pro-
FESSioN? (Rev. ed. 1924) ; Hicxs AND KATZ, UNAUTHORIZED PAmcrics oF L, v (1934) ;
Symposium: The "Unauthorived Practice of Law" Controversy, 5 LAW & Con.M'A.
PROB. 1 (1938); Baldwin, The Unauthori:ed Practice of the Law, 5 LA. L REV. 596
(1944); Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41 YA.s
L. J. 69 (1931); Comment, Attoney and Client: What Constitutes the Practice of Lam?
29 CALi. L. REv. 603 (1941); Notes, 151 A.L.R. 781 (1944), 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940),
114 A.L.R. 1506 (1938), 111 A.LR. 19 (1937), 105 A.L.R. 1364 (1936), 100 A.LR. 236
(1936), 94 A.L.R. 359 (1935), 73 A.L.P. 1327 (1931), 36 A.L.R. 533 (1925). U.n-
AUrTHORiZED PRACTICE NEws, published quarterly by the American Bar Association
Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, and the reports of the local and na-
tional committees in their respective journals afford current information.
2. These twin but not identical objectives have called for variant techniques of at-
tack. The campaign against the "quack" has concentrated on court action in the form
of injunction, quo warranto, and contempt proceedings; that directed toward circuniscrib-
ing the services of banks, insurance companies, trust companies, etc. has had resort to
judicial sanction after attempts at voluntary compromise through the Conference Plan.
See Maxwell, Techniques in Preventing the Unauthoriced Practice of the LazI, 31 IowA-.
L. REv. 301 (1946) ; Resh, Unauthorized Practice of Law-Acthities of the State Bar
Association, [1945] VIs. L. REv. 163; Sanders, Procedures for the Punishment or Sup-
pression of Unauthori:ced Practice of Law, 5 LAw & CoNrTEMP. PRon. 135 (1938) ; Post-
wtar Plan for the Suppression of Unauthorized Practice of Law, 8 Tcx. B. J. 501, 526
(1945) ; 13 UNAUTH. PRc. NEWS, No. 2 at 17 (1947). Examples of the results ob-
tained by the Conference Plan technique are collated in :lgrecinent or Statements of
Principles or Policies, COMPENDIUM 94 ct seq. (1942) ; and see Maxwell and Ch:1es.
Johit Statement as to Tax Accountancy and Law Practice, 32 A.B.A.J. 5 (1946).
The American Bar Association has also sought to sharpen the teeth in the state
laws prohibiting the practice of law by laymen, and to increase the scope of proscription.
The statutes are collected in Appendix B to Laymen See, Amendment to Permit Them
to Practice Law Before Judicial Court, 13 UNAUTrr. PRiAc. NF.ws, No. 2 at 5 (1947) ;
HICKs AND KA-z, UNAUTHORIZED PRAcricE OF LAw 15 (1934). See note 29 infra in
connection -with the Association's efforts in the federal field, and with particular refer-
ence to the statutory background for the principal case, see Recent Statutes, 39 CoL L
REv. 1448 (1939).
For a refreshing and constructive analysis suggesting that repressive measures may
not be the panacea either for the protection of the public or for the economic ills of the
legal profession, consult Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, And Poultices-.Ind Cures?, 5
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRo. 104 (1938). A similar approach is revealed in Morris. Lcqal
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the certified public accountant in the field of income tax practice.8 Profes-
sional friction recently ignited into litigation in the Supreme Court of New
York County where the Committee on Unlawful Practice of Law of the New
'York County Lawyers Association lost a preliminary skirmish in the drive to
restrict income tax practice to the legal profession. 4
In a conference between a corporation's lawyer and Bercu, an experienced
,certified public accountant, subsequently enrolled as a Treasury Department
practitioner,5 a difference of opinion arose as to the proper method for making
certain deductions from the corporation's 1943 federal income tax return,0
and Bercu offered to substantiate his position by locating certain rulings with
which he was familiar. He made a study of the point at issue and submitted a
memorandum to the corporation citing the ruling which he had recalled7 and
Service, 1 LAW, GUILD Rxv. No. 4 at 35 (1941) ; Philadelphia Neighborhood Law Office
Plan, id at 30. Cf. Elson, The Rushcliffe Report, 13 U. oF Cur. L. REv. 131 (1946).
3. E.g., Bentley, Relationship Between the Lawyer and Accountant, 12 FLA. L, J.
359 (1938); Bilder, The Lawyer and the Accountant, [1941] N. J. STATE BAR Ass'N.
YEAR Boox 155; Brooker, Rip Van Winkle Awoke, Federal Tax Practice and the Law-
yer, 18 FLA, L. J. 134 (1944); Donaldson, The Interrelationship of the Lawyer and the
Certified Public Accountant, 18 N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N. BULL. 67 (1946) (a treatment
of specific problems); Fernald, Cooperation of the Accountant With the Attorney, [1941]
N. J. STATE BAR Ass'N. YEAR Boox 137; Hastings, Exploring the Common Field, id at
147; Kripke, A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and "Accounting, 57 HARv. L
REv. 433, 693 (1944) (a technical treatment) ; Maxwell and Charles, supra note 2; May,
Accounting and the Accountant in the Administration of Income Taxation, 47 CoL. L.
REv. 377 (1947) ; Seidman, Cooperation Between Attorneys and Accountants, 17 TENN.
L. R v. 43 (1941); "Tax Service" Practice by Laymen, 28 MAss. L. Q. No. 4 at 36
(1943); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E. 2d 27 (1943); Notes, 31
CALIF. L. REV. 228 (1943), 13 FORD L. REv. 135 (1944), 42 MxcH. L. REv. 1122 (1944),
15 OK.A. STATE B. J. 1562 (1944), 7 U. OF DETROIT L. J. 93 (1944); Report of the
Stan-ding Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 63 A.B.A. REP. 323, 325
(1938); 3 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEws, No. 10 at 116 (1937); 4 UNAUTII. PRAc. NEws, No.
9 at 98 (1938); 4 UNAUTH. PEAc. NEws, No. 11 at 130 (1938).
4. New York County Lawyers Association v. Bercu, 188 Misc. 406, 69 N.Y.S.2d
730 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The case is to be argued in the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, in the fall of 1947.
5. He had been engaged in practice as a certified public accountant in New York
City since 1924 and had been a member in good standing of the New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants since 1942. In 1945 Bercu was admitted to practice be-
fore the Treasury Department of the United States. Id. at 409, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 732. In
connection with practice before the Treasury Department, see note 29 infra.
6. A contest regarding payment by the corporation of a city sales tax for past
years had ended in a settlement, and the question was whether the company, which kept
its books on an accrual basis, could deduct the amount from its 1943 income or whether
such payment had to be allocated pro rata over the previous years when no profits were
made. Id. at 188 Misc. 406, 409, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
7. Bercu did not restrict his search to the tax services. Id. at 410, 69 N.Y.S.2d
at 733. The record on appeal does not reveal the precise extent of his research. The
precedent cited in his memorandum -however was an I.T.; such rulings are made by tile
Income Tax Unit of the Treasury Department, and are reported in the Internal Revenue
(Vol. 561440
which would permit the company to effect a substantial saving. The account-
ant tendered a bill for these services.8 The Lawyers Association brought suit
to enjoin Bercu from such "illegal practice of law" and to have him adjudged
in contempt of court.
Denying the injunction on a procedural point,' but admitting its jurisdic-
tion on the contempt issue,11 the court reaffirmed the New York rule that the
legislature, not the judiciary, holds the power to define and regulate the prac-
tice of law, ' and indicated that respondent's actions were not specifically
Bulletin with the qualification that they only "show the trend of official opinion." Prin-
cipal case, Exhibit I to Petition, Papers on Appeal, p. 20.
8. The corporation did not pay this bill, and in the suit brought by Bercu in the
Municipal Court it defended on the grounds that he had practiced law illegally. Judg-
ment was for defendant, and Bercu did not prosecute his appeal. (Decision unreported).
188 Misc. 406, 410, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730, 733 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
9. Bercu conceded that he had formerly rendered services of this Idnd, and pe-
titioner also felt it to be of significance that he was not actually auditing the books or
preparing the tax forms for the corporation. Id. at 410, 69 N.Y.S2d at 733-4.
10. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §§ 1221a-c provide that action to restrain the activities of
one illegally practicing law may be brought by the Attorney General or by a bar associ-
ation upon proof of a written request delivered to the Attorney General at least tvwenty
days before. Petitioner failed to comply with this provision, and the court held that
wherever the inherent power to define the practice of law may be vested, the legislature
is competent to establish procedures whereby the injunction is to be obtained. 183 Misc.
406, 412, 69 N.Y.S2d 730, 735 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
11. Petitioner was faced with contrary precedents on this point. It had seemed
settled doctrine in New York that contempt would not lie unless the layman's activities
"directly involved" the court. Matter of Rotwein, 291 N.Y. 116, 51 N.E. 2d 659 (1943);
Matter of New York County Lawyers Ass'n. v. Lehman, 256 App. Div. 677, 11 N.Y.S2d
429 (1st Dep't. 1939) ; Matter of New York County Lawyers As'n. v. Clark, 255 App.
Div. 674, 11 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't. 1939). However, Matter of New York County
Lawyers Association v. Cool, 181 Misc. 718, 47 N.Y.S2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd,
268 App. Div. 901, 51 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1st Dep't. 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 853, 62 X.E.2d
398 (1945), seems to abandon this minority position and the principal case offers an-
other precedent to the same effect. See ComPEinoum 36; Resh, supra note 2; Sanders,
supra note 2; 13 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEws, No. 2 at 17 (1947) ; Recent Statutes, 39 CoL
L. Rav. 1448 (1939).
12. Though one of the important holdings of the case, this point is outside the scope
of the present Note. The New York rule is in a distinct minority, and has been severely
criticized on historical grounds as unrepresentative of the common law relation between
the bar and the judiciary. Lee, The Constitutional Power of the Courts over Admission
to the Bar, 13 HARv. L. REv. 233 (1899). The decisions upon which the New York doc-
trine is predicated have also been attacked as inconclusive, fortuitously decided as a re-
sult of their ex parte nature, and undermined by subsequent decisions. See Kennedy, Has
the New York Legislature the Paramount Right to Regulate the Admission of Attorneys?
99 N.Y.L.J. 1658, 1678 (1938); 99 N.Y.L.J. 434 (1938); In the Matter of Cooper, 22
N.Y. 67, sub nom. Matter of the Graduates, 11 Abb. Pr. 301 (1860) (see brief appended
in footnotes in 11 Abb. Pr.); In re Percy, 36 N.Y. 651 (1867); People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
The diametric position, that the judiciary has exclusive inherent power to regulate
the practice of law, is likewise a minority view. Illinois and Nebraska are among those
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proscribed by the statute.13 Even assuming that the statute could be x:ead to
prohibit any practice of law by laymen, however, the court concluded that
respondent's conduct could not be considered to constitute the practice of
law. 1
4
In analysing the conclusion reached in the principal case, it may be well first
to inquire by what right the legal profession may lay claim to social protection
of its monopoly as against lay intruders. 1
The monopoly charter granted to licensed members of the bar is predicated
upon protection of the public interest.' G Certain minimal standards of skill
must be maintained in the field of law, for fraud, error and needless litigation
jurisdictions which adopt this position. E.g., In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899)
People ex rel. The Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Goodman, 366 Ill, 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937);
State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 23 N.W.2d 720 (Neb. 1946). See also note 29 infra.
The majority rule is that the judiciary possesses inherent power to regulate and de-
fine the practice of law, but that this may be supplemented by the legislature by virtue
of its police power. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725
(1932) ; Clark v: Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S. W.2d 977 (1937).
The subject is excellently treated in 36 Micui. L. R-v. 82 (1937) ; Shanfeld, The
Scope of Judicial Independence of The Legislature in Matters of Procedure and Control
of the Bar, 19 ST. Louis L. REv. 163 (1934) ; Consult CotpmNium 60 where the cases on
the court's inherent power are collected and Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232
Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942), another leading case wherein an imposing mass of au-
thority is reviewed.
13. Prior to passage of the Piper Act, N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 750(7), illegal prac-
tice of law was punishable by criminal proceedings only. 188 Misc. 406, 416, 69 N.YS.2d
730, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1947). This statute added the remedy of criminal contempt, but the
principal case holds that it does not broaden the substantive law, and that since the court
has not the power to define what shall constitute the practice of law, respondent's actions
must fall within the narrow proscriptions of the N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 270-1, 280, if he
is to be adjudged in contempt. These provisions forbid laymen to appear in court, to
misrepresent or hold themselves out as attorneys, to prepare certain enumerated legal
instruments, to make a business of practicing before a court or magistrate or to furnish
attorneys or counsel. It is not entirely clear whether the court concludes as an alter-
native ground for the decision that Bercu's actions cannot be fitted into one of the for-
bidden categories, or whether it is content not to decide the point definitively in view of
the a fortiori nature of the final argument. Enumerative statutes, such as that in the
principal case, are not common, the majority simply forbidding the "practice of law" by
laymen. HICKS AND KATZ, UNAUTH. PRACrICE OF LAW 8 (1934) ; note 2 supfa.
14. 188 Misc. 406, 421, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730, 743 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
15. It is possible to proceed in terms of historical or analogic demonstratigns that
certain services or types of services have been traditionally reserved to the legal pro-
fession, and that the bar holds an exclusive franchise in the nature of a property right
which the courts should protect against lay infringement. E.g., Hobson v. Kentucky
Trust Co. of Louisville, 303 Ky. 493, 197 S.W.2d 454 (1946) ; cases collected at Com-
PENDIUm 24. It is suggested that this approach is not adequate in a social climate where
all monopoly is suspect.
16. An excellent treatment of the public's interest in the success of the campaign
against the unauthorized practice of lw is in 28 IowA L. REV. 116 (1942), where the
bar's position is persuasively argued. See CHEATHATM, op. cit. supra, note 1 at 55; 59
A.B.A. RxP. 531 (1934) ; 36 MIcH. L. REV. 82 (1937).
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are the inevitable consequences of permitting untrained, unlicensed persons to
advise clients in the highly technical matters which comprise today's legal lore.
Moreover, the lawyer must be held to a standard of absolute responsibility and
adherence to an exacting code of ethics as a correlative to the peculiar trust
which is placed in him in his capacity as counselor, advocate and "officer of
the court. ' 17 Thus, the technical and representative nature of the services
rendered by the lawyer demands particularized skill in the execution, and un-
impeachable responsibility in the performance. To assure these, society has
decreed through its legislatures and courts that an area of activities shall be
reserved to a qualified licensed group denominated "lawyers." 18
But to decide that public policy requires that a certain group of services be
reserved to members of the bar is not to determine what shall be incorporated
within this area. The courts and legislatures have repeatedly sought to give
definition to the phrase "practice of law",19 but a priori generalizations have
proved of little assistance in determining whether a particular service should
be reserved to the lawyer and denied to the layman. -'0
The real question would not seem to be whether certain conduct can by
analogy be categorized into a definition of "practice of law", but whether the
service in question is such that the public interest requires a particular skill
possessed only by the trained lawyer, and a standard of personal responsibility
which the lawyer alone can guarantee.2 '
17. The phrase is the common one and the United States Supreme Court has re-
cently approved it. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). See the historical
treatment in footnote to In the Matter of Cooper, in the 11 Abb. Pr. 301 (N. Y. 1,69)
reprint sub non. fatter of the Graduates, and COHEN, op. cit. mspra note I, cc. 4-6. The
term is perhaps considerably less literally accurate today than when applied to the com-
mon law English courts, but it remains true that the lawyer is an important cog in the
machinery through -which justice is administered.
18. To observe that some lawyers are not remarkable for their skill nJr exemplary%
as paragons of responsibility is not to confute the policy underlying the creation of the
monopoly, but to question the effectiveness of the machinery now employed in its en-
forcement.
19. Consult, e.g., for definitions frequently approved, Eley v. filler, 7 Ind. App.
529, 535, 34 N.E. 836, 8,37-8, (1893) ["(I)t includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments... by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be depending [sic] in a court"]; In re Eastern Idaho Loan and
Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 286, 288 Pac. 157, 159 (1930) ["(W)here . . . the legal effect
[of a mass of facts and conditions] must be carefully determined by a mind trained in
the existing laws in order to insure a specific result and guard against others . . :"].
Cases defining the phrase are collected at COZM1PENDIUM 50; and see Notes, 151 A.LR.
781 (1944), 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940), 111 A.L.R. 19 (1937); 33 Wo.s AND PnrAsnS
193; 5 Am. JuR. 262 et seq.
20. E.g., Grievance Committee of Bar of New Haven County v. Payne, 123 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623 (1941) ; Creditors' Service Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.IL 291, 190 At. 2
(1937); In the Matter of the Shoe frs. Protective Ass'n., M95 Mass. 369, 3 N.E_2d 746
(1936). 'Most of the authorities simply concede that each case must be decided on the
particular facts involved.
21. Llewellyn, supra note 2; 42 AficH. L. Rnv. 1122 (1944). Decisions wherein the
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An approach cast in terms of functional criteria, however, offers no me-
chanical solution to the problem of lay practice in the tax field. Tax questions
peculiarly require varying degrees of legal and non-legal expertise,2 '2 and
virtually the only certain statement that can be made is that sufficient qualifica-
tiof for the solution of one problem does not necessarily imply competence in
all aspects of the next. The practical impossibility of an a priori determina-
tion of the limits of permissible activities of lay tax consultants in general is
reflected in the present inconclusive state of the law on the point."3 The
specific role of the accountant in the capacity of tax consultant has been little
litigated and the cases are equally unsusceptible of rationalization, but the
court's position in the principal case does not appear to mark a radical de-
parture from existing precedent.24 Moreover, the instant decision would ap-
court explicitly recognizes the policy criteria underlying the lawyer's monopoly include
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W.2d 945 (1939) (a particularly
extensive treatment of the precedents) ; Crawford v. McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P.2d
551 (1935); R. I. Bar Ass'n. v. Automobile Service Ass'n., 55 R. I. 122, 179 Atl. 139
(1935).
It is necessary, of course, that such criteria be applied in terms of the qualifications
of a class, not an individual. The administrative burden would be intolerable if the courts
were left to assess post hoc the individual qualifications of each layman assertedly en-
gaged in the practice of law. For an interesting example of the operation of this prin-
ciple see In re Brainard, 55 Idaho 153, 39 P.2d 769 (1934), where a former probate
judge, not a member of the bar, was enjoined from rendering legal advice regarding wills.
22. On this point at least, all are agreed. Virtually every discussion of the subject
is prefaced by a statement that tax problems represent a seamless web of legal precepts,
accounting principles and factual contexts. See note 2 supra.
23. Laymen's activities in the tax field held not to constitute illegal practice of law:
Merrick v. Am. Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (App. D.C. 1939), ("incidental" activi-
ties in advising on tax problems) ; Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., 220 Ind. 202, 41
N.E.2d 140 (1942) (assistance in preparing forms, and issuance of tax information
pamphlets); Tanenbaum v. Higgins, 190 App. Div. 861, 180 N.Y. Supp. 738 (1st Dep't.
1920) (appearance before tax commissioner).
Laymen's activities held to constitute illegal practice: People cx rel. Courtney v.
Ass'n. of Real Estate Tax-payers of Ill., 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933) (corporate
legal services offered in tax claims) ; Bump v. Dist. Ct. of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623,
5 N.W.2d 914 (1942) (solicitation for assignments of tax refund claims) ; N. Y. County
Lawyers Ass'n. v. Standard Tax and Management Corp., 181 Misc. 632, 43 N.Y.S.2d
479, (Sup. Ct. 1943) (opinions on tax laws) ; N. Y. County Lawyers Ass'n. v. Dawkins,
262 App. Div. 56, 27 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1st Dep't. 1941), aff'd 289 N.Y. 553, 43 N.E.2d 530
(1942) (appearance before Board of Assessors) ; People ex rel. Trojan Realty Corp. v.
Purdy, 174 App. Div. 702, 162 N.Y. Supp. 56 (1st Dep't. 1916) (protests on tax assess-
ments) ; It re Durham, 190 Okla. 588, 126 P.2d 69 (1942) (tax actions procured and
notices filed); Crawford v. McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P.2d 551 (1935) (taxpayers'
association contracts to investigate possible refunds); Blair v. Motor Carriers Service
Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939) (tax statute interpretations).
The current temper of some members of the bar would suggest that this problem
may be the subject of increasing clarification through litigation. 49 Com. L. J. 186
(1944) ; note 3 supra.
24. Accountants' activities in the tax field held not practice of law: Wardman v. Leo-
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pear to be supported by application of the suggested functional criteria, of skill
and responsibility even though the services performed by respondent can
doubtless be easily analogized to the "practice of law."
Many considerations would appear to lead to the conclusion that in point of
specialized skill, the certified public accountant is competent to advise on the
usual questions that arise in connection with income taxation.5 It was inevi-
table that the income tax laws should adopt to a considerable extent the tech-
niques and concepts by which the accountant arrives at computation of in-
come,26 with the consequence that ever since the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment it has been the established custom of the business community to
entrust to the accountant the bulk of its taxation problems. 7 Aspirants to the
pold, 85 F.2d 277 (App. D.C. 1936) (contract by accountant to handle tax claims before
Tax Court); Dunlap v. Lebus, 112 Ky. 237, 65 SAV. 441 (1901) (compromise on tax
suit negotiated); Elfenbein v. Luckenbach Terminals, Inc., 111 N.J.L. 67, 166 At. 91
(1933) (devising of tax savings plan for client) ; see Humphries v. Comm'r. of Int. Rev,
88 F.2d 430, 432 (C.C.A. 2d 1937) (lawyers-accountants tax consultants), approving in
a different context. For two Federal cases which appear to approve of accountants'
rendering advice on taxation, see Girard Investment Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 122
F.2d 843, 848 (C.C.A. 3rd 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 699 (1942); Arnold v. Comm'r
of Int. Rev., 14 B.T.A. 954, 970-6 (1928), appeal disinissed, 38 F2d 1011 (C.C.A. 8th
1929).
Accountants' activities held to constitute illegal practice of law: Chicago Bar Ass'n.
v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 IlL App. 243, 38 N.E.2d 349 (1941) (accountant's
corporation to handle tax matters before Finance Department); Lowell Bar Ass'n V.
Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943) ; 13 FORD. L. REv. 135 (1944), 28 % Lss. L Q.
No. 4 at 36 (1943), 42 Micm. L. REv. 1122 (1944), 15'OLA. STATE BAR J. 1562 (1944),
7 U. DmirrT L. J. 93 (1944) (advice on tax law interpretation and advertising legal
counsel; the court, however, permitting respondent to fill out income tax forms) ; 'Mandel-
baum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656, 290 N.Y. Supp. 462 (City Ct. of
N.Y. 1936) (interpretation of statutes for clients).
25. That certain cases regarding taxation manifestly require the dual services of the
lawyer and the accountant is undeniable, but this argument does not seem to substantiate
the contention that lawyers should be given a monopoly of the practice any more than
should accountants.
26. Blough, The Role of Accounting in the Taxing Process, 22 Tim AccounirNG Ra.
248 (1947) ; May, supra note 3; RonnTs, AccounTInG METHODs n; I,.co=r- TAxA'rIon
(1940); Ballantine, Taxable Income, 40 JOURNAL OF AccouN"rNcy 349 (1925).
It may, indeed, be argued that a major source of the present confusion in this coun-
try's tax laws has been the injection of the legal approach at the expense of accounting
principles. It has been said that "The collection of the revenues is primarily an admin-
istrative not a judicial proceeding. As far as the Federal income tax is concerned, a field
of administration has been turned into a legal battlefield." 3 JoiNr Coa.I =rEE RarorT
oN INTmRNAL REVENUE TAXATION 2, 3 (1927), cited in May, supra at 336. To the ex-
tent that this is true, the solution would not seem to lie in further extension of the role
played by the legal profession.
27. May, supra note 3; Report of the Standizg Connittec on Unatithoriwd Prac-
tice of the Law, 70 A.B.A. REP. 257, 259 (1945) ; Vernon, Anwrican Bar Association to
Sponsor Tax Courses for General Practitioners, 29 A.B.A.J. 516 (1943); 7 Ass'zn. oF
THE BAR OF N.Y., LEcTuREs ON LEGAL Topics 3 (1929); principal case, app. I to Affi-
davit of Win. R. Donaldson, Papers on Appeal, p. 248.
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status of certified public accountant must familiarize themselves with the
principles of income taxation in order to pass the stringent examinations for
admission to the profession.28 Furthermore, in recognition of the rigid skill
standards of the profession and its relevancy to taxation questions, the Fed-
eral government has for years permitted approved certified public accountants
to appear in behalf of clients before the Treasury Department and the United
States Tax Court.' The successful experience of these agencies with ac-
28. Communication from the American Institute of Accountants to the Yale Law
Journal, July 24, 1947. Principal case app. C to Affidavit of Wni. R. Donaldson, Papers
on Appeal, p. 147.
29. Treas. Circ. 230, 1 FED. RE(. 1413 (1936); Tax Court of the United States
Rules of Practice, 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 701.2 (1938). If such representation be consid-
ered to constitute the practice of law, and if it be assumed that the judiciary is vested
with inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law, it can then be argued
that, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislative and administrative
branches are under a disability to authorize appearance by laymen in a representative
capacity before these quasi-judicial bodies. This argument by the bar associations has
been effective in some states. Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. United Taxpayers of America, 312
Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E.2d 349 (1941) (Finance Dep't.) ; People cr rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n. v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E.2d 941 (1937) (Workman's Compensation
Board) ; State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 23 N. W.2d 720 (Neb. 1946) (Railway Com-
mission) ; 31 MiNN. L. REv. 288 (1947), 95 U. PA. L. REv. 218 (1946) ; note 12 supra,
The result, of course, is that only members of the bar may engage in practice before
these agencies. For a reaction from the layman, see Zoll, The Childe Case and Its
Significance to the Non-Lawyer Practitioner, 14 I.C.C. PRAcT. J. 38 (1946).
It is frequently said that the U. S. Supreme Court has held that Federal adminis-
trative agencies may permit lay practitioners to appear before them. Goldsmith v. U. S.
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926). The Court in that case, however, merely up-
holds the power of the agency to exclude those whom it considers unqualified and de-
clines to issue a writ of mandamus ordering petitioner's admission to practice. It has
been suggested that the bar should press a test case to a conclusive result. Micon, The
Case of Unauthorized Practice of Law, 32 A.B.A.J. 684 (1946) ; Brooker, supra note 3.
On the legislative front too, the American Bar Association has supported measures
designed to restrict the latitude given federal agencies in the choice of their practitioners.
The results so far have not been successful. Attempts include H.R. 4798, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1939), and amendments proferred to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
60 STAT. 240, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1005 (a) (Supp. 1946) but all such proposals have died in
committee. Micon, supra; Report of Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 70 A.B.A. REP. 257 (1945).
The current effort is H.R. 2657 "Administrative Practitioners Act," now before the
Committee on the Judiciary. Administrative Practitioners Act: Association Offers Bill
to Regulate Admissions, 33 A.B.A.J. 307 (1947) ; Otterbourg, Statement on Admifistra.
tlive Practitioners Act, 13 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWs No. 2 at 1 (1947). For a different
view, see Statement of American Institute of Accountants Before the Committee on the
Judiciary Urging Amendment of H.R. 2657. See also Laymen Seek Amendment to Per-
init Them to Practice Law Before Judicial Court, 13 UNAUTH. PRAC. Naws No. 2 at 5
(1947), where it is argued that the Tax Court has become a de facto judicial body, that




countant practitioners30 and the longer experience in income tax administra-
tion in England, where the accounting profession occupies the field of taxa-
tion to the virtual exclusion of the bar, would clearly appear to attest to the
qualifications of the accountant in this respect.3 '
The requirement of responsibility would also seem to be fulfilled insofar as
the certified public accountant is concerned. Although the profession is a rela-
tive newcomer 32 it has earned for itself a prestige of reliability which ranks
with that of the time-honored callings, for the essence of the function of the
certified public accountant is the reliance which others may place upon his
word. Admission to the profession is limited to those of approved character,
and the American Institute of Accountants exacts adherence to a canon of
ethics which in many respects parallels that for the lawyerPas In a business
economy which operates on confidence in the reliability of certification by the
public accountant it would be difficult to enjoin the accountant from rendering
advice in the income tax field on grounds of lax ethical standards.
Clearly the accountant is not to be given carte blanche to advise clients on
matters outside the purview of his specialty.34 The presumption, however,
30. Evidence that the present system is satisfactory would seem to lie in the con-
sistent refusal of Congress to close this field to the accountant. Note 29 szpra. It is
also of significance to note that non-accountant laymen seeking to practice before the
Treasury Department are ex-amined for their knowledge of accounting subjects, questions
being drawn from the American Institute of Accountants examinations. Principal case,
Appendix G to Affidavit of ,Vm. R. Donaldson, Papers on Appeal, p. 232; Communica-
tion to the YALE L. J. from the American Institute of Accountants, July 24, 1947. The
consistent opinion of tax administrators and students of tax administration has been that
accountants are qualified for this type of practice. See 1 BEn:jui,:, AoDh is wivE
ADJuDIcATIoN IN THE STATE OF NEW Yonx 117-8; 4 id. 36-8, 2-4 (1942). As to the
public's satisfaction with the accountant's services, see Annital Retort of the Cotmnittee
on Unlawful Practice of the Law for 1943-44, [1944] Assocm,%on oF rn B,% or" TUE
CITY OF NEW YORK, YEAR Boox 300.
31. MAGTLL, PARKER AND KING, A Su.MMARY OF THE BrTsI TAx SvswTi , iTwu
SPECIAL REFERENCE To ITS ADmINISTATION (1934) ; Halsey, The Position of the Pu!blic
Accountant in relation to Business and Governnit in Great Britain, [1943] DicKu:so:
LEcTUREs IN AccoUNTING 51; principal case Appendix B to Affidavit of VIm. R. Don-
aldson, Papers on Appeal, p. 129.
32. The status of certified public accountant was first established in New York by
statute in 1896. 'May, sitpra note 3. A brief history of the profession is given in Appendix
B to Affidavit of Vim. R. Donaldson, Papers on Appeal (principal case) p. 129.
33. CAREY, PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING (1946); Carey, The Real-
ities of Professional Ethics, 22 THE ACCOUNTING REv. 119 (1947) ; Maxwell and Charles,
supra note 2 at 7; and see R. NV. Hart & Co. v. Harris, 183 Okla. 5MR, 83 P.2d 565
(1938), where judicial recognition is given to the fact that accountants practicing before
the Treasury Department are held to the lavyer's code of ethics.
34. This problem of circumscribing the accountants' activities will probably be-
come even more difficult as tax considerations become increasingly enmeshed with fiscal
and legal considerations in the making of daily business decisions. The difficulty of such
separation, however, does not seem to justify the exclusion of the accountant from per-
forming those services for which he is qualified.
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always operates against monopoly, and the bar, when seeking to invoke judi-
cial sanction to prohibit laymen from performing certain services, must
shoulder the burden of demonstrating that those services can be properly
rendered by the legal profession alone, Tested by the criteria of skill and
responsibility, an experienced certified public accountant would seem amply
qualified to advise his clients on a taxation point which the Supreme Court of
the United States has expressly characterized as primarily a problem in ac-
counting.3 5
While the result in the specific case can be approved on the basis of a
functional analysis, it must be recognized that the court, in refusing to cate-
gorize Bercu's activities as constituting the "practice of law", thereby commits
itself to the position that all non-lawyers, regardless of qualification, are
privileged to perform similar services. But this result is rendered inevitable
only because it is beyond the power of the court to limit its decision to the
competency of the certified public accountant where the statute treats the
problem solely in terms of a lawyer-layman dichotomy: i.e., forced to choose
one of the alternatives, the court is not at liberty to classify further and to
discriminate within the generic classification of "laymen" so as to deny to one
group of non-lawyers that which it grants to another. The legislative depart-
ment is under no such disability. If the public interest is found to be threat-
ened by the activities of unqualified persons in the tax field, it is competent for
the legislature to prohibit unqualified laymen from engaging in tax practice
while recognizing the special qualifications of other laymen. But in the
absence of such legislative action; the policy of excluding from tax practice
those who are incompetent should not be crudely effectuated by judicial exclu-
sion of those who are competent.
Such services as those performed by respondent Bercu fall within an area
held in common tenancy by the legal and accounting professions. Where
there is such an overlap in professional jurisdictions, the proper forum for
the arbitration of competing skills is the market place, not the court room.
35. Questions of accounting are questions of fact and not of law. Dobson v,
Conim'r of Int. Rev., 320 U.S. 489 (1943) ; Paul, Dobson v. CommLsioner: The Sirange
Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARv. L. REv. 753 (19.44) ; 9 MaiRENs, LAW or FEDERAL IiN-
coiE TAXATION § 51.19 (Supp. 1947). "Accrual" is an accounting question, and princi-
ples of accounting lead to the conclusion that tax liability does not accrue while being
contested, but only upon adjudication. Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.,




DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS TO FORESTALL
JURISDICTION OF ADJUDICATIVE
AGENCIES*
The private litigant's most effective method for challenging the jurisdiction
of an administrative agency is to prevent the assumption of such jurisdiction
ab initio. Two important advantages are gained thereby: the arduous process
generally required by statutory provisions for judicial review' is bypassed,
and the usual rule that administrative findings of fact are conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence - is avoided. While devices like the injunction3
have long been used to forestall jurisdiction, the declaratory judgment has
recently emerged as a weapon equally effective and more readily available be-
cause free from the technical requirements which encrust older remedies.
Like injunctions, declaratory judgments challenging jurisdiction ab initio have
* N. Y. Post Corp. v. Kelley, 296 N. Y. 178, 71 N.E. 2d 456 (1947).
This Note deals only with the facet of the problem presented by agencies acting
adjudicatively; questions of rule-making and of other actions allegedly ultra vires lie
beyond its scope. While the dividing line between "adjudicative" and "rule-making" ac-
tivities is admittedly obscure, it may be generally described as the difference between
"judicial" and "legislative!' functions, as these words have been used by the courts. See
H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) concerning the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. §1001 (Supp. 1946), and §1001(c), (d) of that
Act; Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 670, 679-31 (1947).
1. For example, review of certification orders under both the original National
Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §160 (1940) (hereinafter cited by
U.S.C. section number only) and the New York State Labor Relations Act, N. Y. Ltu1oa
LAw §707 (1937) (hereinafter cited by section number only) may be obtained only after
the certified union has filed against the employer a charge of unfair labor practices for
refusal to bargain with it, and the Board has issued a "cease and desist" order. AF of L
v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1939) (national Act); and see note 11 infra (N. Y. Act).
The Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 10th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 23, 1947) appar-
ently makes no change in the federal rule.
2. E.g., §160 (e) of the original NLRA, supra note 1, as interpreted in Vashington,
V. & M. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 147 (1937), and as amended by §101 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, supra note 1. Section 160(e) now in terms requires that findings be
supported by "substantial" evidence. See also §707 (2) of the N. Y. Act (conclusive "if
supported by evidence") which is usually construed in similar terms; N. Y. Labor B'd.
v. Select Operating Corp., 183 Misc. 480, 49 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (scintilla of
evidence not enough).
3. In federal courts and in most states the injunction is the standard remedy; in
New York, however, other remedies such as writs of prohibition are more frequently
used. See 1 BENjAmI=I, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONT I NEW YoRr 350-65 (1942).
4. Irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy at law must be shown in order
to obtain an injunction. In addition to sharing these requirements, writs of prohibition
or mandamus are generally restricted to clear breaches of duty. A declaratory judg-
ment, on the other hand, is not thus encumbered. See BoncrAIW, DsctmrmTon- JUDG-
imNrTs 358-7, (2d ed. 1941). And administrative agencies may be expcted to comply
with such declarations as completely as where a coercive writ is granted. Id. at 875-6.
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frequently been permitted to "construe statutes" but are refused by most
courts when "facts" determining an agency's jurisdiction are disputed. In
New York Post Corporation v. Kelley," however, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has given its approval to a highly questionable doctrine permitting a
declaratory judgment on "jurisdictional facts."
In the Post case, plaintiff newspaper publishers requested a declaratory
judgment that defendant New York State Labor Relations Board had no
jurisdiction over a dispute concerning union representations of licensed news-
dealers. Plaintiffs claimed that (1) the newsdealers were "independent mer-
chants" and not "employees" and (2) that rival unions petitioning for certifi-
cation were both affiliated with the A. F. of L. within the prohibition of the
statute's "sister-union" clause.6 Rejecting the Board's claim that it should be
permitted to hold a formal hearing to determine initially its own jurisdiction,
the trial court held that a declaratory judgment was appropriate and ordered
a trial on the merits.1 Over vigorous dissents, its action was upheld by both
the Appellate Division8 and the Court of Appeals.0
Statutory obstacles to judicial review, not present in the Post case, have
often led courts to grant declaratory judgments on jurisdictional issues.
Where, for example, court review of agency jurisdiction can be obtained only
by risking heavy damages or criminal penalties, a prior judicial determination
is obviously desirable.1 0 But where no such risks are incurred, courts have
5. 296 N. Y. 178, 71 N. E.2d 456 (1947).
6. ". . . provided, however, that the board shall not have authority to investigate
any question or controversy between ... organizations affiliated with the same parent
labor organization." N. Y. LABOR LAW §705(3).
7. 61 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1946). The court also suggested that the unions be
joined as defendants so that any judgment on the merits would be binding on them as
well as on the Board. Id. at 268.
8. 270 App. Div. 916, 61 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1st Dep't 1946). Affirmance was per
curiam without opinion; Peck, J., dissented.
9. 296 N.Y. 178, 71 N.E. 2d 456 (1947). Desmond and Fuld, JJ., dissented on
grounds that the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction in
the first instance. Id. at 190, 71 N.E. 2d at 460. Clear-cut decision on the issues by the
Court of Appeals was possibly befogged by statutory provisions placing jurisdiction over
actions for declaratory judgments within the exclusive discretion of the Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeals may have been reluctant to reverse the decision of the Appellate
Division in such action in the absence of a finding of abuse of discretion as a matter of
law. N. Y. CiviL PRAcTIcE Acr §473; RULES OF CIVIL PRocEauRE, Rule 212; Post case,
.mpra at 189, 71 N.E.2d at 460.
10. For example, it is often necessary to pay a disputed tax or post a bond before
securing judicial review of a tax commission decision and sometimes before securing
even a commission hearing. These burdens have led many state courts to grant declara-
tory judgments on jurisdictional issues. E.g., Booth v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 573,
68 N.E.2d 870 (1946) ; Donoghue v. Bunkley, 247 Ala. 423, 25 So.2d 61 (1946). Contrd:
Williams v. Tawes, 179 Md. 224, 17 A.2d 137 (1941). Declaratory judgments on federal
taxes, however, are barred by a 1935 amendment to the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act. 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. §400(1) (1940). As to state taxes, the Supreme
Court has held that the declaratory judgment is available in a federal court only where
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been more hesitant to interfere with the administrative process."' In these
cases the propriety of a prior judicial determination often depends upon the
theoretical basis of the attack upon jurisdiction. Attacks are based either on
the claim that proper "statutory construction" deprives the agency of jurisdic-
tion, or that the dispute does not involve the necessary "jurisdictional facts"--
a term which includes both the naked "evidentiary facts," e.g., whether a
newsboy receives a salary, and the "ultimate" facts which contain legal conclu-
sions drawn from the evidence,' 2 e.g., whether the newsboy is an "employee."
While in theory "statutory construction" includes only those rare instances
where the scope of a statute may be determined without reference to the
specific factual situations-e.g., -whether a provision prohibiting an agency
from assuming jurisdiction under certain conditions also precludes agency
investigation to determine whether these conditions exist13-in practice, courts
have found the distinction difficult to maintain. As a result, cases which ap-
pear to involve disputed "jurisdictional facts" have frequently been classified
as "statutory construction" problems.14
the relief available in a state court is inadequate. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. Y.
Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (state relief held adequate); Hillsboro Township v.
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946) (state relief held inadequate). For discussion of the
federal policy see BoRcHAEM, op. cit. supra note 4 at 825; Note, 50 Y,%Ex L. J. 927 (1941).
Cf. Johnson Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 738 (1937) 28 U.S.C. §41 (1) (1940) (restricts use
of injunction in similar situation).
Similarly, where action incurring criminal penalties is a prerequisite to judicial re-
view, state courts are likely to permit declaratory judgments. E.g., New York Foreign
Trade Zone Operators v. State Liquor Authority, 285 N.Y. 272, 34 N.E2d 316 (1941),
and see Borchard, Chalk-nging "Penal" Statutes bv Declaratory Action, 52 Yalm L. J.
445 (1942).
11. An example is afforded by the instant case. Violation of the Act, e.g., employer
refusal to bargain with a certified bargaining agent, results only in a Board cease and
desist order and such a final order is, of course, subject to judicial review. N. Y. Labor
Law. §707. Penalties can be imposed only for violation of a court decree enforcing a
Board order.
12. Although the distinction between "law" and "fact" remains hazy, the categories
of evidentiary and ultimate fact propounded in THAYEn, A PRmaintA- Tnmnxisn o:;
EvmENcE 197 (1898), appear useful in clarifying the problem. See Brown, Fact and Law
in Judicial Review, 56 HAnv. L. Rrv. 899 (1943).
13. Section 705 (3) of the New York Labor Law contains a provision of this type,
see page 1450 and note 6 supra, but the meaning of this section was not decided in the
Post case. The court held that regardless of whether the Board had such jurisdiction,
the court possessed concurrent jurisdiction. For an argument that declaratory judg-
ments on an agency's jurisdiction should be limited to this type of problem, see 1 BE:-
j.iuni, op. cit. supra note 3, at 364. For less clear-cut examples of "statutory construc-
tion" see State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Blair, 347 Mo. 820, 146 S.W. 2d 865
(1940) (whether suburban truckers are within intra urban exemption to Bus and Truck
Act) and Bank of Yorktown v. Boland, 280 N.Y. 673, 21 N.E.2d 191 (1939) (whether
N.Y. Labor Relations Act gives Board jurisdiction over bank employees).
14. E.g., Inland Empire Rural Electrification, Inc. v. Wash. Dep't Public Service, 199
Wash. 527, 92 P2d 258 (1939) (whether corporation a "public service corporation" under
a utilities regulation act).
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The Post decision, which permits a declaratory judgment on both evi-
dentiary and ultimate jurisdictional facts, represents an extreme position
which has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court and by most
state courts. Equating the declaratory judgment with the injunction, 6 the
Supreme Court has adhered strictly to its rule requiring exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies 6 and has therefore denied both devices in all but the
most exceptional circumstancesY17 In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp.,8 where both evidentiary and ultimate facts were disputed, the Court
upheld the exclusive right of the National Labor Relations Board to deter-
mine ihitially whether a company was engaged in interstate commerce. That
this doctrine applies even where no evidentiary facts are disputed was empha-
sized in Macauley v. Waterman Steamship Co. 9 where the Court held that
"'questions of coverage [should not be judicially determined] when the admin-
istrative agencies authorized to do so have not yet made their determina-
tion.' *0 Lower federal courts have generally adhered to the Supreme Court
doctrine,21 although occasional decisions have deviated from the norm.2 2 And,
15. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
16. See FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174 (1927); applied now as a
cardinal principle of judicial administration, this rule antedates even Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1909), the case with which its origin is commonly associated.
See Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L. J. 981 (1939). The
rule has also been applied to prevent judicial determination of an agency's jurisdiction hi
court proceedings which are initiated solely for the purpose of enforcing administrative
subpoenas. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 212 (1946) (Fair
Labor Standards Act); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)
(Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act).
17. Order of Ry. Conductors of America v. Swan, 67 Sup. Ct. 405 (1947) (declara-
tory judgment granted where administrative boards unable to reach decision because of
deadlock between employer and employee representatives) ; cf. Hillsboro Township v.
Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 (1946) (state statutory relief inadequate).
18. 303 U.S. 41 (1938). Although the primary relief demanded was injunctive, in
both the Myers case and its companion case, Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock
Co. v. Schauffler, 303 U. S. 54 (1938), declaratory relief was also sought and refused.
19. 327 U.S. 540 (1946) (applicability of federal renegotiation statute to shipping
contracts signed by British officials). This case seems to modify the earlier doctrine of
Great Northern Railway v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922), on "primary
jurisdiction," in so far as the latter case permitted judicial interpretation of an interstate
tariff rule (where no administrative expertness was required) in spite of the ICC's exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the field.
20. 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946). That the prescribed judicial review might prove inade-
quate, moreover, was termed a future contingency which did not justify an exception to
the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Ibid. The case is strengthened,
moreover, by the fact that no question of administrative expertise was involved.
21. Bradley Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F. 2d 97 (C.C.A. 5th 1936), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 559 (1936) (NLRA); Bucklin Coal Mining Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Comm'n, 53 F. Supp. 484 (W.D.Mo. 1943) (validity of insurance fund tax under state
unemployment compensation law) ; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Rhoades, 39 F.
Supp. 589 (W.D.La. 1941) (Longshoremen's Compensation Act) ; accord, Miles Labora-
tories Inc. v. FTC, 140 F. 2d 683, 685 (App. D.C. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944)
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although the problem of initial "statutory construction" has not yet been
decided, the fact that no dispute has been so classified, coupled with the broad
language as to "coverage" used in the Watcrinan case, makes doubtful any
exception to the federal policy of judicial restraint.
State courts have been less consistent in forbidding such declaratory judg-
ments. A few make them unavailable on either law or fact.2 Many permit
initial "statutory construction," but refuse to consider any "jurisdictional
fact";24 frequently the dividing line remains extremely hazyf and may be
shuttled expediently.2  Only a few courts will avowedly draw the legal con-
(determination of false advertising); Aron v. FTC, 50 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.Pa. 1943) (de-
termination of unfair trade practices).
22. In Ark. Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 156 F. 2d 821 (App. D.C.
1946), the circuit court held that a potential jurisdictional conflict between the FPC and
the Arkansas Public Service Commission justified the use of a declaratory judgment; but
the Supreme Court reversed because of plaintiffs failure to exhaust its administrative
remedies, 67 Sup. Ct. 963 (1947). In Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 34 F. Supp. 980 (E.D.La. 1940), the court, apparently influenced by the heavy
expenses to the Gas Co. of a scheduled rate investigation, allowed a declaratory judgment
but this decision seems contrary to the Supreme Court policy as expressed in Petroleum
Exploration, Inc. v. Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (193S).
23. Williams v. Tawes, 179 Md. 224, 17 A.2d 137 (1941) (validity of state income
tax); Provident Mut'l Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 126 N.J.L.
348, 19 A.2d 630 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) (whether certain insurance agents were "em-
ployees" under state unemployment compensation law); Judge of Probate v. National
Surety Corp., 49 A.2d 635 (N.H. 1946) (surety's liability upon probate bond) ; Blacl: v.
Utter, 300 Ky. 803, 190 S.W. 2d 541 (1945) (jurisdiction of Director of Motor Trans-
port). But cf. Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.M. 2d 620 (1939) (statu-
tory applicability of unemployment insurance tax).
24. Compare California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1946)
(whether plaintiff agency constituted an insurance business under supervision of insurance
commissioner treated as statutory construction) and Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 369, 190
S.W. 2d 709 (1945) (whether truck company w-as a "carrier" under state occupation tax
termed statutory construction, but court influenced by absence of any speial taxation
tribunal) with State eax rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Padberg, 346 'Mo. 1133, 145 S.W. 2d
150 (1940) (whether certain trucks were within load weight exemption to bus and truc
Act termed a jurisdictional fact) ; Idaho Mut'l Benefit Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793,
154 P. 2d 156 (1944) (employee status under unemployment compensation act termed jur-
isdictional fact), and Prudential Insurance Co. v. Powell, 217 N.C. 495, 8 S.E.2d 619
(1940) ("employee" status under unemployment state compensation act termed jurisdic-
tional fact).
25. E.g., the issues in the Blair, Cobb, and Garrison cases, cited supra notes 13 and
24, were declared to involve "statutory construction," although it would have been equally
persuasive to categorize them as matters of "jurisdictional fact."
26. E.g., while the Oregon Supreme Court has denied declaratory judgments on jur-
isdictional facts [Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Galloway, 163 Ore. 85, 121 P.2d 469
(1942)], it has escaped from its doctrinal meshes by labeling as "statutory construction"
the ultimate-fact-laden question of whether certain rates were "new" rates within the
jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission; Union Pac. ILR. v. Bean, 167 Ore. 535,
119 P. 2d 575 (1941) (a compelling factor in the decision may have been the Commission's
practice of revoking its order each time the company sought judicial review).
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clusions which are properly components of ultimate facts,2 7 and, except in
New York, no case has been found permitting declaratory judgments on an
agency's jurisdiction where evidentiary facts are not established. 8 The Post
decision, therefore, is far beyond the customary state doctrine and at the op-
posite end of the judicial spectrum from federal policy.-
Permitting ab initio attacks on an agency's jurisdiction, whether the issue is
"statutory construction" or disputed "jurisdictional facts", indicates an un-
realistic application of the criteria for private litigation where declaratory
judgments have long been utilized to settle disputed facts, to avoid delay, and
to construe statutes.30
Administrative agencies-unlike private litigants-possess full authority to
construe statutes. That the legislature intended agency determination of
jurisdiction to precede judicial determination may be inferred from statutory
provisions giving an agency exclusive powers in a specialized field 31 and mak-
27. Inland Empire Rural Electrification, Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Pub. Serv., 199 Wash.
527, 92 P. 2d 258, 261 (1939) (declaratory action determining whether corporation was
"public service corporation" under state public utility law). See also note 26 supra. Such
decisions are more frequently found where taxes are involved, and where the commission
has already reached its conclusion. See note 10 supra; cf. Texas Company v. Bryant, 178
Tenn. 1, 152 S.W. 2d 627 (1941) and Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134
S.W. 2d 620 (1945) (both cases involve "employee" status under unemployment compensa-
tion act) (but see note 23 supra.). Wash. Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176,
91 P. 2d 718 (1939) ("employee" status of newspaper carriers under unemployment com-
pensation act termed question of law), approximates the Post case closely. It may be dis-
tinguishable, however, since an agency ruling on the question had been made prior to the
court action.
28. Cases forbidding declaratory judgments on ultimate facts necessarily preclude
them on evidentiary facts; decisions permitting such judgments on legal conclusions care-
fully specify that no "facts" (i.e., evidentiary facts) are disputed. See cases cited notes
26 and 27 supra, and see BORCHARD, op. cit. supra, note 4 at 342-5.
29. However, even prior to this decision, New York courts had authorized extensive
use of declaratory judgments to challenge administrative jurisdiction. Tax cases: All
American Bus Lines Inc. v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 571, 68 N.E. 2d 869 (1947);
Richfield Oil Corp. v. City of Syracuse, 287 N.Y. 234, 39 N.E. 2d 219 (1942) ; Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 11 N.E. 2d 728 (1937). Cases in-
volving New York Labor Relations Board: Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Kelley, 295
N.Y. 607, 64 N.E. 2d 352 (1945), reV'd, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026 (1947) (propriety of using de-
claratory judgment action not discussed) ; Bank of Yorktown v. Boland, 280 N.Y. 673, 21
N.E. 2d 191 (1939) ; Rubel Corp. v. Boland, 177 Misc. 683, 31 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup, Ct.
1941) (declaratory judgment permissible to determine power of Board to act at all under
N.Y. LABoR LAW § 705 (3) ; see note 6 supra). But cf. In re Zone Oil Trucking Corp.,
27 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (Board should not be forced to discuss merits of contro-
versy before investigation).
30. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937) (settlement of disputed
facts, see BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 393) ; Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N.D. 603, 200
N.W. 524 (1924) (statutory construction, see BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 788-
801) ; see List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 257, 129 Atl. 64 (1925) (avoidance of delay). For
other advantages of declaratory judgments, see BORCHARD, supra at 279-89.
31. E.g., §160(a) of the National Labor Relations Act ("This power shall be exclu-
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ing its findings of fact conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.P2 The
granting of a declaratory judgment on jurisdictional issues undermines that
intent by demoting the agency from the role of a respected arbiter to that of
an ordinary litigant.
Where the facts are disputed, moreover, the technical knowledge and special
experience possessed by administrative agencies may often make them more
familiar with customary practices, and hence, more competent fact finders
than the ordinary judge or referee. Furthermore, in determining such issues
as whether a newsboy is an "employee", administrative agencies are less likely
to be handicapped by stare decisis or swayed by criteria developed for the
solution of other problems,3 3 and, rather than eliminating delay, the unfortu-
nate effects of which are particularly important in union certification proceed-
ings,2 4 judicial intervention may only serve to increase it.35 The presumption
must be that the agency will make a correct decision on its jurisdiction,3" and
where the court reaches the same conclusion that the agency would have
reached, needless delay may have been caused.37 Furthermore, a declaratory
sive .. ."). Jurisdiction of the New York State Labor Relations Board to conduct hear-
ings on questions of union representation is not specifically termed exclusive, but the
Board in this field possesses special powers (see N.Y. Labor Law §§705-6) which no
other tribunal has claimed, so that the word "exclusive" would seem superfluous. See Des-
mond, J., dissenting in the Post case at 193, 71 N.F_. 2d at 462.
32. See note 2 strpra. In considering the Post case, it should also be remembered that
in a 1938 election the people of New York rejected a proposed amendment to the state
constitution which would have permitted judicial review of an agency's decision on both
law and facts. Considerations of comity, moreover, should be particularly persuasive
where, as in the Post case, the agency has actually scheduled a hearing on the disputed
question. See Berger, supra note 16 at 1006.
33. E.g., in determining "employee" status under a labor relations act, the standards
of respondeat superior developed for vicarious liability problems should not be conclusive.
Accord, NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124-6 (1944). As to the importance
of administrative expertise in matters of this kind see the Hearst case supra at 1,0.
34. Although a union may represent a majority of employees at the time when certifi-
cation is sought, the natural loss of interest produced by inaction and the opportunity thus
provided for pressure against union adherents can do serious damage to its chance oi be-
coming a certified bargaining agent. Cf. S BENJ.MI, op. cit. supra note 3, at 179 n2,) of
Report on Labor Board.
35. Indiscriminate application of the Post rule to workmen's compensation and unem-
ployment insurance, where thousands of cases hinge on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, would be particularly productive of delay. See Desmond, J., dis-
senting in the Post case at 194, 71 N.E. 2d at 463, and Berger, supra note 16 at 1005.
36. See, e.g., Dalton Machine Co. v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 699, 701 (1915); ne v.
Walsh, 295 N.Y. 198, 206, 66 N.E. 2d 53, 56 (1946).
37. Where jurisdiction is upheld, initiation of administrative proceedings may have
been delayed; where it is denied, similar denial by the agency would have terminated the
controversy far more expeditiously in those situations where, as in the Post case, no ap-
peal from such an agency order is authorized. See S BE. JzAmi, op. cit. supra note 3, at
180 of Repori on Labor Board. Only in a minority of instances, where the court denies
jurisdiction and the agency would have found that it existed, has delay in final disposition
been avoided.
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judgment upholding agency jurisdiction can be appealed; and such appeal
does not preclude the possibility of appeal from a final agency order on some
other ground, e.g., abuse of discretion, thus producing a double set of appeals
and further delay. If judicial action is limited to reviewing an agency's final
order, jurisdiction as well as other phases of the order can be challenged, thus
providing adequate protection for private rights38 without producing an in-
ordinate delay in the ultimate decision.
Admittedly, in those rare instances where the applicability of a statute can
be determined without regard to particular facts, the case against declaratory
judgments is less compelling: there is less need for agency expertise and it is
impossible to find any legislative intent that agency action should precede ju-
dicial decision.39 On the other hand, interruption of the administrative
process is an objection as cogent here as where facts are disputed. Moreover,
the confusion resulting from efforts to segregate "statutory construction"
from "jurisdictional facts" offers an inviting loophole to any trial court
desirous of limiting administrative action, and breeds that uncertainty which
leads to increased litigation.40
These considerations, 4 1 plus the fact that agency errors can be corrected
38. Nor would the increased cost of litigation seem to justify the use of a declaratory
judgment to test jurisdiction, any more than where a party seeks judicial review of an
agency intermediate order. In the latter case, judicial review is usually denied. Petroleum
Exploration, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Ky., 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938) (plaintiff cor-
poration's investigation costs of $25,000 termed "part of the social burden of living under
government" and held not to justify issuance of injunction against agency's assuming jur-
isdiction). See also 5 BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 178-9 of Report on Labor Board
and SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1935).
39. It is only agency findings of fact that are to be accorded deference on judicial re-
view (see note 2 supra). See also BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 878.
40. See Berger, supra note 16, at 1004 for discussion of the desirability of agency in-
terpretation of its own statute; Desmond, J., dissenting in the Post case at 199, 71 N.E.2d
at 465; and BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 878. Where an agency itself desires guid-
ance as to the correct interpretation of the statute, of course, a declaratory judgment is
highly desirable. See BORCHARD, id. at 888-96. Such a judgment is particularly useful to
settle disputes between governmental agencies, e.g., Kirby v. Nolte, 351 Mo. 525, 173 S.W.
2d 391) (1943) (dispute between St. Louis civil service commission and Board of Alder-
men).
41. Other objections to initial judicial determination of agency jurisdiction may be
an initial lack of uniform decisions among lower tribunals, particularly where a federal
statute is involved, NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944), and the
danger that judicial hostility to the statute may impair its enforcement.
Another factor which renders the declaratory judgment undesirable is the dilemma
which it poses for agencies which must decide between adversary parties: if the agency
does give an opinion on facts which it has not officially ascertained, it abdicates the role
of impartial umpire and becomes an adversary in the dispute which it is supposed to adjudi-
cate; if it does not take a stand on the disputed facts, it cannot defend its jurisdiction. See
Desmond, J., dissenting in the Post case at 198, 71 N.E.2d at 465. Nor does the possibility
that agency assumption of jurisdiction might contravene existing judicial doctrine consti-
tute grounds for permitting a declaratory judgment; conditions might have changed or a
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freely on judicial review, indicate the desirability of a state rule limiting,
rather than expanding, the use of declaratory judgments to decide jurisdic-
tional issues.2 Allowing agency determination of jurisdiction ab initio-the
federal rule-provides adequate protection of private rights and insures more
effective and more expeditious statutory enforcement.
special problem justifying agency action might be presented. Matcovich v. Cal. Employ-
ment Comm'n, 64 Cal. App.2d 40, 14S P.2d 118 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944). Thus, in the Post
case the fact that an existing decision, People v. Mlasiello, 177 Mfisc. 603, 31 N.Y.S. 2d
512 (Sup. Ct 1941), held that newsdealers vere not "employees" within the meaning of
the state anti-injunction act should not have prevented the Board from examining the
status of the employees six years later and under a different statute. Furthermore, the
fact that the Masiello decision was that of a nisi prius court tends to minimize its value,
as does the fact that the United States Supreme Court had held that newsboys are "em-
ployees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. Hearst Pub-
lications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
42. Judicial limitation appears preferable to legislation because of the possible pro-
priety of declaratory judgments in exceptional instances. See note 17 supra. If legislation
is found necessary, prohibition of declaratory judgments in cases involving specific statutes
like the NLRA would be preferable to an inflexible general amendment to the Declaratory
Judgment Act like that removing from federal courts the power to issue declaratory
judgments on federal tax problems (see note 10 stpra).
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